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Collaborative Verification and the Control of Nuclear Tests1
Nancy W. Gallagher
Nuclear arms negotiations epitomize the mixed motives that characterize international cooperation. Arms control
offers mutual benefits by averting war, minimizing destruction, and lowering the cost of security. Yet, leaders
often hesitate for fear of cheating, unequal benefits from mutual compliance, and internal opposition to arms
control.
Verification is often viewed as a technical solution to the political problems of collaboration with no global
authority to enforce contracts and protect cooperative players.2 Both cooperation theory and U.S. security policy
maintain that accurate judgments about compliance can increases cooperation.3 Reliable detection capabilities
lower the risk of exploitation by providing timely warning when violations occur. Reciprocal strategies deter
defection and encourage cooperation if states know whether to punish or reward other players. Finally,
publicizable information about compliance raises domestic support for successful accords and reduces popular
pressure for arms control with unreliable partners. In this benign view of verification, more is better. When
technical or diplomatic limits on verification capabilities exit, policy makers must decide “how much is
enough?”—that is what detection probability makes the benefits of arms control outweigh the costs and risks.4
The Reagan administration used this reasoning to depict Soviet support for joint efforts to improve
verification as the “litmus test” of their commitment to arms control.5 At that time, Americans longed for
mutual cooperation, but worried about being “tricked again.”6 They sought a “low-risk, working relationship
that improves only if and when the good faith of the other side has been clearly demonstrated.”7 Verification
collaboration—ranging from passive acceptance of satellite surveillance to data exchanges to inspections at
suspect sites—appealed to ambivalent Americans as second-order cooperation (i.e., joint measures that are not an
end in themselves, but facilitate more substantive cooperation). Such proposals offered a low-risk way to test
Soviet intentions and minimize the role of trust in arms control. When Soviet acquiescence to unprecedented
verification cooperation preceded accords on intermediate-range nuclear forces (1987), conventional forces in
Europe (1990), strategic arms reductions (1991), and verification protocols for two détente-era treaties on nuclear
                                                
1. The author would like to thank the following individuals for helpful comments and suggestions: Thomas Cochran, Martha Crenshaw,
Anthony Daley, Vicki Golich, Richard Harknett, Warren Heckrotte, Peter Rutland, and Jacob Scherr.
2. For the purposes of this paper, “verification” is defined as decision-making about the extent to which cooperation is occurring in a
formal or informal arms control regime. The process of verification includes the definition of cooperation, information collection,
analysis, and evaluation. “Monitoring” will refer to data collection about any type of military activity and “intelligence gathering” or
“espionage” will refer to monitoring efforts that support unilateral security options rather than arms control cooperation. These
distinctions are important because definitions that equate verification as a neutral process of information collection to increase
transparency ignore both the political aspects of defining, analyzing, and evaluating cooperation, and the possibility that the information
will be used to support unilateral action rather than cooperation.
3. The classic statement of the U.S. policy position that arms control verification should detect, deter, and reassure is U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Verification: The Critical Element of Arms Control,Publication No. 85 (Washington, DC: GPO, March
1976). Robert Barker, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) under President Ronald Reagan, discusses verification in
similar terms, although his formulation places more emphasis on detecting violations than on deterring them. See “The Verification of
Arms Control, Disarmament Agreements and Security,” Disarmament 11:2 (Summer 1988): 2–11. On verification as a means to increase
transparency in cooperation theory, see Kenneth Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986),
pp. 16–18; Robert Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., Internatio al Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 159–161; and Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990),
pp. 113–150.
4. Allan Krass, Verification—How Much is Enough? (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), pp. 140–152. Other works on the politics of
verification include Krass, “The Politics of Verification,” World Policy Journal 4 (Fall 1985): 731–753; Michael Krepon, “The Political
Dynamics of Verification and Compliance Debates,” in William Potter, ed., Verification and Arms Control (Lexington, Mass.: D. C.
Heath, 1985), pp. 137–141; Mark Lowenthal and Joel Witt, “The Politics of Verification,” pp. 153–168 in Potter; and Mark Lowenthal,
“The Politics of Verification: What’s New, What’s Not,” The Washington Quarterly 14:1 (Winter 1991): 119–130.
5. Eugene Rostow, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U. . Senate, 24 July 1983.
6. Daniel Yankelovich and Richard Smoke, “America’s ‘New Thinking,’” Foreig  Affairs 67:1 (Fall 1988): 1–17.
7. Yankelovich and Smoke, p. 16.
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testing, many Americans concluded that verification collaboration was the safest and surest route to arms
control.8
The test ban case offers an excellent opportunity to test this conclusion. Presidents from Eisenhower to
Carter maintained that an “adequately verifiable” Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) would enhance security if both
sides agreed on a verification system. The USSR claimed to share this goal, but its reluctance regarding
technical talks and intrusive verification raised U.S. doubts about Soviet intentions and contributed to failure in
two rounds of trilateral CTB talks (1958–63 and 1977–80). The modest treaties that were negotiated—the 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty (PNET)—minimized verification disputes but did not slow the arms race. Reagan raised
concerns about verification and compliance to justify further delay in TTBT and PNET ratification, and an end to
CTB negotiations. Two collaborative projects in the mid-1980s—an in-country seismic monitoring
demonstration by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS),
and a Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) of on-site yield estimation at U.S. and Soviet test sites—preceded
TTBT and PNET ratification and accompanied agreement on a “step-by-step” approach toward a CTB. On the
surface, then, the test ban case supports the view that verification collaboration increases cooperation.
This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of verification collaboration in three periods: (1) the early
comprehensive talks that culminated in the LTBT, (2) test ban cooperation and controversy during the rise and
fall of détente, and (3) the competing collaborations of the mid-1980s. It examines the main components of
arguments about verification and the strategies used to manage conflicting concerns about verification during
domestic debates and international negotiations. Cross-temporal analysis explores continuity and change in the
impact of collaborative proposals at times when official preferences are mixed, favorable, or unconducive to
arms control. Detailed analysis of two projects in one period compares the effect of transnational and
intergovernmental collaboration.
The test ban case shows that verification collaboration is more, rather than less, political because it is
second-order cooperation. Even definitions are controversial: for example, Soviet plans for cooperative
verification often involved joint judgments about compliance while U.S. proposals invariably differentiated
between international efforts to improve information collection and national responsibility for compliance
evaluation. Calls for collaborative projects are advanced by many different actors, some of whom are not
seriously concerned about improved verification, and some of whom are not really interested in arms control at
all. Whereas previous works on the politics of verification have advocated efforts to “depoliticize” verification by
first achieving a national consensus on the benefits, costs, and risks of arms control,9 I find that neg tiators and
domestic groups often try to frame verification questions as technical problems to avoid discussion of deeper
questions. Attempts to reach consensus or to take test ban verification decisions out of the political arena never
succeeded. Instead, the success or failure of test ban proposals depended on shifting patterns of alignment and
alliance among groups with divergent first principles—that is bedrock beliefs about the value of arms control,
other states’ intentions, deterrence stability, and the nature of verification itself. Judging compliance involves
tradeoffs between maximizing the value of compliance information and minimizing the costs and risks of
verification itself. U.S. proposals for verification collaboration emphasized its benign features, while Soviet
reactions stressed the costs and risks. The superpowers never outlawed any tests which either side still wanted to
conduct, largely because these lop-sided ways of thinking about verification undermined support for significant
arms control. Instead of offering an escape from the political dilemmas of cooperation, controversies over
collaborative verification complicated and perpetuated domestic disagreements about arms control policy,
U.S.–Soviet disputes about compliance evaluation, and global attempts to address the contradictions inherent in
arms control and deterrence.
                                                
8. For example, Ronald Lehman II, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) under President George Bush,
concluded that “verification glasnost led to and reinforced political glasnost,” fundamentally reshaping U.S.–Soviet relations. See
“Lehman’s Lessons: The Arms Control Agenda,” Arms Control Today 21:10 (19 December 1991): 9.
9. See, for example, Lowenthal and Witt’s argument that the way to depoliticize verification is to have a national discussion about
“what we can expect from arms control, how much risk we are willing to accept, and how much uncertainty we can tolerate,” p. 168.
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Framework For Analysis
In the politics of verification, suspicious states and contentious domestic groups struggle to reach agreement
about the principles and procedures to use for evaluating arms control compliance. Proposals for verification
collaboration are part of a much larger argument between negotiators and among domestic groups who reason
about verification from conflicting first principles:10
1) Is mutual cooperation on this issue desirable?
2) Is the other side seriously interested in arms control?
3) Would low levels of cheating and/or unequal relative gains matter?
4) How does verification alter arms control outcomes?
In this section, I use these four questions to categorize the main groups engaged in test ban verification
politics and to suggest how proposals for technical collaboration are used in strategies to alter arms control
outcomes.
Applying the framework to the test ban case shows which actors use various strategies most effectively and
why test ban technology collaboration often produces unexpected results.
First principles spring from individual and organizational interests as well as general foreign policy beliefs.
Attitudes toward arms control and verification are complex and do not always correspond neatly to power
positions or bureaucratic roles. Different U.S. presidents have held divergent views about a CTB and some, such
as Eisenhower, changed positions over time. Each attitude has adherents in the Executive Branch, Congress, the
scientific community, and the attentive public, and many individuals hold contradictory beliefs or hybrid
principles. But only by comparing and contrasting basic assumptions that shape verification preferences can we
see how arguments turn into arms control outcomes.
This framework rests on two other important simplifications. First, my analysis of domestic politics
focuses primarily on the United States, both because more information is available and because it is reasonable
to assume that social groups will have greater influence in more pluralistic countries. However, the distinction
that I develop between arms control advocates, cautious cooperators, and unilateralists can be a valuable heuristic
to distinguish the structure of any state’s official arms control policy, to compare competing interpretations of
motives behind official declarations, and to characterize internal debates that are accessible to external analysts.
Second, my analysis of test ban negotiations focuses primarily on superpower interactions. The TTBT, PNET,
and the nuclear testing talks of the late 1980s were strictly bilateral, while the United States and United
Kingdom usually coordinated positions in the two generations of CTB negotiations. When U.S. and British
positions diverge, or when third parties play an important role in test ban verification politics, however, the
framework can encompass these developments.
Domestic debates about verification are shaped by common and conflicting answers to three questions.
Table 1 summarizes these answers and the resulting verification predisposition.
Arms Control Advocates seek a CTB to slow the arms race, preserve deterrence stability, hamper proliferation,
and decrease environmental damage caused by nuclear tests.11 To them, he logic of nuclear vulnerability dictates
that other countries should also want to lower the costs and risks of deterrence. Arms control advocates expect
CTB compliance to be high because a mutual ban serves everyone’s interest. Both superpowers can destroy each
other many times over, so arms control advocates do not worry about small tests that might escape detection.
                                                
10. The most explicit statement of the idea that arguments about arms control and verification are structured by incompatible
assumptions can be found in the essays in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1989). As I have argued elsewhere, previous works on the politics of verification traced preferences to underlying beliefs about
Soviet intentions or U.S. nuclear strategy in ways that over-simplified the structure of verification arguments and failed to recognize that
ideas about verification have an independent effect on arms control outcomes. See Nancy W. Gallagher, The Politics of Verification
(manuscript).
11. Steve Fetter, Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988) provides an excellent assessment of the main
arguments for and against a CTB.
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Since they value cooperation, expect voluntary compliance, and discount low-level cheating, they can be flexible
about verification arrangements.
Cautious Cooperators agree with arms control advocates about the value of a reciprocated CTB, but worry about
other states’ intentions and deterrence stability. Deep ambivalence about nuclear vulnerability characterizes many
Americans’ attitudes toward arms control.12 For cautious cooperators, the destructive power of nuclear weapons
creates incentives and opportunities both for mutual cooperation and unilateral action. They assume that foreign
leaders also have mixed motives and may be tempted to exploit arms control. Cheating is a serious concern for
cautious cooperators: secret tests would either provide a military advantage or indicate willingness to violate
treaties for little military benefit. Verification is ri cal to cautious cooperators’ support for arms control
depends because they experience the arms control dilemma most intensely. The more doubtful they are about
other’s motives and deterrence stability, the greater will be their verification demands.
Unilateralists neither desire mutual limits on weapons tests nor believe that other nuclear powers intend to stop
testing. They reject reciprocal restraint for any or all of three basic reasons. First, many unilateralists oppose
arms control in the belief that one preserves peace by preparing for war. Nuclear tests, they believe, are
necessary to modernize arsenals; improve stockpile reliability and survivability; increase accuracy; develop
strategic defenses; and enhance command, control, and communication during a nuclear war. If so, banning tests
would destabilize deterrence and increase destruction should war occur. Second, many belong to organizations
designed to protect national security through unilateral means. Regardless of whether soldiers and weapons
scientists are philosophically opposed to arms control, they have organizational incentives to preserve flexibility
and to maximize resources for nuclear tests.13 Third, unilateralists fear the relative impact of arms control.
Would a test ban lock less developed players into permanent inferiority or prevent more advanced countries from
exploiting a comparative advantage? Would states that could develop weapons without testing or compel nuclear
scientists to continue clandestine research suffer less under a CTB?
Unilateralist opposition to arms control is exacerbated by a deep distrust of the adversary and a strong
conviction that low levels of cheating and unfavorable relative gains would give others a devastating advantage.
Whereas cautious cooperators think about mixed motives and temptations to cheat, unilateralists view interstate
relations as pure competition and assume that adversaries will exploit each other whenever possible. When
realpolitik notions are compounded by ideological assumptions about the adversary’s devious intentions, the
picture grows still grimmer. Since unilateralists also believe that small differences in the quantity or quality of
nuclear systems provide political leverage or military advantage, their opposition to a CTB is over determined
regardless of verification capabilities. Unilateralists, however, often use rigid verification demands to sabotage
negotiations or to maximize national advantage if some limits seem inevitable.
Since arms control advocates and unilateralists share one first principle with cautious cooperators, they have
used verification arguments to compete for the support of cautious cooperators in the absence of national
consensus on the benefits, costs, and risks of arms control. Unilateralists tried to convince cautious cooperators
                                                
12. Numerous studies have shown U.S. public opinion to be relatively constant, but deeply ambivalent and highly misinformed on
matters of nuclear security. For example, Everett Carll Ladd found a forty-year tradition of support for arms control and distrust toward
the Soviet Union, national technical means of verification, and legalistic solutions to security problems. See “The Freeze Framework,”
Public Opinion (August–September 1982).
13. Arms control advocates and cautious cooperators may self-select into organizations, such as grassroots activism groups or think
tanks, that reinforce preexisting beliefs about arms control principles, but national defense bureaucracies can have an independent
socializing effect on unilateralists that is not paralleled in the other two groups.
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that the USSR would never accept intrusive verification so that debates about whether reciprocated restraint
could serve U.S. security interests would be pointless. Arms control advocates tried to persuade cautious
cooperators that obtainable verification arrangements would lower the risks of noncompliance far below the
benefits of a mutual ban so that their combined pressure for negotiations might outweigh unilateralists’
opposition. Thus, although neither arms control advocates nor unilateralists would request verification
collaboration if their compatriots accepted their arms control principles, they often propose it as a domestic
political strategy to court cautious cooperators.
Competition for the middle ground explains why actors often use language in ways that create confusion
about their motives for advancing or opposing verification collaboration. U.S. policy in the 1970s resembled
the arms control advocate’s position and demands for “adequate” verification were explicitly tied to an operational
standard: the ability to detect militarily significant violations in time to compensate for any disadvantage.14 The
1980s requirement for “effective” verification is more problematic because the concept was never formally
defined or operationalized.15 Reagan entered office convinced that arms control was fatally flawed, the USSR
was an “evil empire,” and the nuclear balance favored the Soviet Union, so his notion of “effective” verification
initially matched a unilateralist’s “excessive” demands. As public pressure for arms control talks grew, some
U.S. officials sounded more like cautious cooperators and adopted legalistic language to describe “effective”
verification. The Intermediate-range and Shorter Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) shows that Reagan
eventually valued some arms control and believed that Gorbachev faced similar incentives for cooperation. U.S.
officials described INF verification as “effective,” yet the monitoring provisions focus primarily on militarily
significant violations. The shifting meaning of “effective” emphasizes the need to analyze calls for verification
collaboration in terms of first principles and operational requirements rather than arms control rhetoric.
This three-fold distinction clarifies domestic debates about monitoring requirements, but confounds analysis
of Cold War disputes about verification collaboration. The USSR claimed to value verification, yet leaders
before Gorbachev consistently tried to minimize monitoring and maximize national control over inspection.
Soviet negotiators maintained that states only sign agreements that they intended to keep, that national technical
methods could detect militarily significant cheating, and that a small probability of discovery would deter
clandestine tests. Such themes resonated with U.S. arms control advocates who believed that the USSR accepted
mutual vulnerability and recognized the need for arms control. With different frames of reference, cautious
cooperators and unilateralists in the West drew other lessons. Those whose commitment to arms control hinged
on accurate compliance information saw resistance to cooperative verification as evidence that the USSR did not
really want a CTB. U.S. unilateralists used Communist opposition to verification as a decisive argument in
their case against arms control.
These conflicting interpretations shared the assumption that increased verification always improves
cooperation. To encompass superpower arguments about CTB verification, or key controversies in multilateral
arms control negotiations and surprising shifts in official U.S. verification preferences, one must analyze
divergent ideas about the benefits, costs, and risks of verification itself. To the extent that all three domestic
groups share basic assumptions about the relationship between verification and cooperation, “conception of
verification” is an independent variable that cannot be derived from other first principles.16
                                                
14. In the Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter Administrations, treaty provisions were “adequately verifiable” if “any
Soviet cheating which would pose a significant military risk or affect the strategic balance would be detected by our intelligence in time
for the United States to respond effectively.” See The SALT II Treaty: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate,
96th Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979) Part 2, pp. 239–240.
15. Comments about effective verification by senior Reagan officials suggest the following guidelines. First, arms control can only
enhance American security if the United States first determines what limits would be strategically-significant and then decides on
measures to ensure verifiability. Second, treaty language must specify obligations clearly and precisely. Third, verification systems must
provide unambiguous evidence of any and all violations. Fourth, U.S. officials must be able to document noncompliance without
compromising valuable sources of secret intelligence. Finally, U.S. leaders must be willing to expose and respond to suspected violations
even if that causes a rift in U.S.–Soviet relations. For specific statements, see William Rowell, Arms Contr l Verification: A Guide to the
Policy Issues for the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1986), pp. 86–87.
16. The best source of information in English about Soviet verification policy during the Cold War is R. M. Timerbayev, Kontrol’za
Organicheniyem Vooruzheniy i Razoruzheniyem (Moscow, 1982) translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service as Verification of
Arms Limits and Disarmament (November 1984).
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All decision makers face a choice between making verification “workable” and making it “tolerable.” At any
given time, though, circumstantial factors may make some states more sensitive to one side of the equation. As
a liberal democracy arguing with a more closed and authoritarian society, the United States stressed the positive
functions of verification information during the Cold War, while Soviet writings and negotiating positions
emphasized the negative features of verification.17 The USSR acknowledged the reassurance functions of
verification, yet condemned the potential military, political, and economic costs of intrusive monitoring.
Although U.S. security specialists often argued that the Soviets had less need of verification because military
activities are more transparent in the West, this misstates the main contextual difference. All countries try to
protect the military information most relevant for monitoring compliance, and all have intelligence sources
searching out their rival’s secrets. In the USSR, foreign policy decisions were made by a small group with
access to classified intelligence information, while “verification in the United States is as much a matter of open
and sometimes uninformed public debate as it is of hard calculation based on self-interest.”18 Whil  U.S. policy
makers worry less about increasing popular support for security policy or more about admitting foreigners to
sensitive locations, they show more sensitivity to verification trade-offs. Access issues explain why Americans
rejected arms control inspections as infringements on sovereignty in the beginning of the Twentieth Century,
and why they scaled back demands for intrusive verification in the post-Cold War era.
Verification includes many fixed costs. Monitoring tests requires money, trained personnel, and
sophisticated technology. Cooperative verification can also complicate procedures for conducting permitted
nuclear blasts and chemical explosions. While these expenses are small compared with the size of U.S. and
Soviet defense budgets, they decrease the value of arms control as a cost-cutting measure. Budget constraints
currently prevent the International Atomic Energy Agency from fully implementing nonproliferation safeguards.
Likewise, financing the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Republics is one issue
slowing the START ratification.
The known costs of successful cooperation cause less concern than the uncertain risks that verification may
be abused for competitive gain. Where secrecy is a security asset, transparency poses military risks.19
Knowledge needed to assess compliance can be dangerous if cooperation breaks down. For example, data about
testing practices exchanged during CTB talks would improve yield estimations and predictions about weapons
development if negotiations fail. Moreover, verification may reveal information about military programs that are
not covered by arms control agreements.
Verification also poses political risks. For example, false accusations generate negative publicity and
hostility, while ambiguous compliance evidence fuels domestic debates about security policy. Increased contact
through cooperative verification may correct misperceptions and improve relations, or generate friction,
harassment, and institutionalized mistrust. When states restrict information and limit contact with foreigners as
a means of social control, then data exchanges, site visits, and other forms of verification collaboration raise the
risk of political subversion. Liberal and conservative Americans hoped that cooperative verification would
“democratize” the USSR, but Soviet leaders were reluctant to be changed against their will.
Finally, monitoring may involve economic risks, especially when treaty-limited technology has both
military and civilian uses. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) provides the clearest example. Countries with
advanced nuclear energy programs objected that safeguards would increase industrial espionage, accounting
expenses, and sales restrictions, while less developed states feared that nonproliferation verification would slow
modernization. In the test ban case, the main economic risk reflects the opportunity costs of foregoing peaceful
nuclear explosions (PNE) when states cannot verify that they are not being used to circumvent limits on
military tests.
                                                
17. One theoretical article by an American who discusses some verification tradeoffs is Stephen Meyer, “Verification and Risk in
Arms Control,” International Security 8:4 (Spring 1984): 111–126.
18. Alan B. Scherr, The Other Side of Arms Control (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 256.
19. For example, a U.S. representative to the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference remarked, “We were much impressed by the
importance which Soviet representatives attached to secrecy as a military asset. In effect, they seem to believe it enables them to possess
a form of ‘hardening’ of their bases which we do not have. Thus they regard any encroachment upon this secrecy as a unilateral
disarmament step . . . on their part which must be compensated for by other measures.” Statement by William C. Foster, Disarmament and
Foreign Policy, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 61–63.
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Arms control advocates, cautious cooperators, and unilateralists in the USSR share verification
predispositions (flexible, critical, or rigid) with their American counter-parts, but their concern about the costs
and risks of verification produce different verification preferences. Table 2 incorporates both dimensions into the
analytical framework:
While arms control advocates in the USSR rarely saw a need for test ban technology collaboration, they
were more likely than their compatriots to accept some cooperative verification because they valued a CTB,
assumed that others will use verification to sustain arms control, and doubted that low-level collateral
information collection or political friction would destabilize relations.20 The costs and risks of verification
increase ambivalence for cautious cooperators: their support for arms control depended on accurate compliance
information, yet their belief in mixed motives and temptations to defect exacerbated anxiety about the
probability and potential consequences of verification abuse. They would tolerate technology collaboration only
if national monitoring methods were clearly deficient and projects are designed to minimize risk. Finally,
unilateralists who thought in terms of verification trade-offs held a malign view of technology collaboration,
both because they expected it to be exploited for competitive advantage and because they opposed test limits
regardless of the value of verification. Because American unilateralists saw international relations in much the
same terms as their Soviet counterparts, they could anticipate and exploit Soviet concerns about verification
trade-offs more readily than could other U.S. groups.
Once one recognizes verification trade-offs, technical collaboration is not a free good or a low-risk way to
test intentions and increase compliance information. Players who are content with national monitoring systems
will want concessions from players whose higher verification requirements increase the costs and risks of
cooperation. A “try before you buy” approach asks states concerned with verification trade-offs to pay some
costs and accept some risks of verification with no commitment to an arms control sale.21 When verific tion
cooperation is cost-free to some participants and extremely risky to others, intensity of expressed interest in
technical collaboration does not correlate with depth of commitment to serious arms control.
In short, this framework facilitates the systematic analysis of test ban verification collaboration in several
ways. Differentiating between arms control advocates, cautious cooperators, and unilateralists reveals continuity
in verification argument even when group membership and policy influence change over time. Evaluating U.S.
policy by the first principles that it embodies indicates when official preferences favor cooperation and whether
technical collaboration could promote arms control. When examining Soviet attitudes toward collaboration, one
can compare characterizations advanced in the United States and recognize distortions caused by ignoring
verification tradeoffs. The framework indicates important changes in official Soviet verification policy and
incorporates available evidence about internal disputes. Finally, it draws attention to strategies can alter arms
control outcomes.
The rest of this paper examines how negotiators and domestic groups used verification collaboration in
identification, alliance, realignment, and avoidance strategies. Americans often advanced proposals for test ban
technology collaboration to identify other actors as arms control advocates, cautious, cooperators, or
unilateralists. Drawing conclusions about other’s interest in arms control from their attitude toward technical
collaboration, however, ignores the ways in which preferences are shaped by concerns about verification
                                                
20. Citations—Timerbayev and Israelyan.
21. Richard Lugar, “Verify and then Trust,” New York Times, 6 June 1989, p. 23.
Table 2 Preferences in International Verification Politics
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tradeoffs. Thus, American unilateralists could use collaborative proposals to disguise their own antipathy toward
arms control and to misidentify Soviets who might have actually wished to cooperate.
In alliance strategies, arms control advocates or cautious cooperators portray verification as a technical
problem or promote collaborative verification as domestic political maneuvers designed to woo cautious
cooperators. Their goal is to build a strategic coalition that can shape domestic security policy without a
national consensus on arms control principles. Actors may also see collaboration as a way to forge
transboundary alliances in order to promote their position in domestic debates or intergovernmental negotiations.
In realignment strategies, the goal is to alter individuals’ beliefs about arms control and verification so as to
change the political balance at home or abroad. For example, joint research projects could convert cautious
cooperators into arms control advocates by altering perceptions of intentions and monitoring abilities.
Alternatively, Western demands for inspections could convince cautious collaborators in the USSR to resist
verification abuse, while Soviet rejection of collaborative verification might then persuade cautious cooperators
in the United States to embrace unilateral security strategies.
Finally, calls for cooperative projects to improve verification can be used to avoid dealing with conflicting
incentives for arms control and competitive weapons development. Arms control and deterrence can both be seen
as contradictory exercises, arms control because its involves cooperating with an adversary and deterrence because
it requires credible threats to undertake irrational actions. Rather than face these contradictions directly, national
leaders often avoid them by expressing support for cooperation at some future date after verification problems
have been solved.
Analyzing technology collaboration in terms of identification, alliance, realignment, and avoidance
strategies suggests that interactions between domestic and international politics are extremely complex.
Negotiating and ratifying a verification agreement is not simply a matter of satisfying domestic groups and
national leaders with fixed interests.22 Arguments about test ban verification collaboration are also employed to
define the game, to change its structure, and to determine whether or not it even gets played.
Disarmament Deadlock, Technical Collaboration, and Early Test Ban Talks
Early arms control advocates hoped that test ban technology collaboration could solve the verification deadlock
that blocked disarmament during the first nuclear decade. By proposing a partial measure where long-distance
monitoring systems provided extensive compliance information, they tried to identify and ally with cautious
cooperators. Optimism soared in 1958, when scientists from the East and West agreed on a CTB verification
system. Yet, in a period when superpower policy reflected a cautious cooperator’s ambivalence about arms
control, technical talks failed to “depoliticize” verification and promote cooperation. Instead, scientific consensus
obscured political disputes. To minimize risks for the West, U.S. negotiators justified exacting verification
demands as purely benign and technically determined. This reinforced Soviet fears about the costs and risks of
verification. It also set precedents that U.S. unilateralists then used to raise cautious cooperators’ resistance to
compromises that could have secured a CTB.
Verification disputes were the most visible reason that ten years of disarmament proposals produced no
agreements. The West wanted comprehensive verification before arms reductions as a guarantee against cheating,
while the East wanted disarmament first to reduce tensions and temptations for verification abuse. Both sides
maintained that their concerns were legitimate and that the other made unreasonable demands to sabotage
negotiations. Nobody could resolve the disarmament deadlock without knowing whether these disputes reflected
cautious cooperators’ anxiety or unilateralists’ clever maneuvers.
If one considers U.S. and Soviet security situations, both positions were compatible with sincere interest in
stable cooperation.23 Since the United States had a nuclear monopoly but a conventional disadvantage and an
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information handicap vis-à-vis the secretive Soviet Union, they would not relinquish their “winning weapon”
without “foolproof” verification. The Soviets worried less that the United States would cheat and more that they
would manipulate the control organization in order to spy, interfere with internal affairs, or legitimate
preemptive attack against suspected violations. To them, secrecy was a security asset that must be preserved
until tensions decreased.
While the disarmament deadlock might represent a tragic case of misperception and missed opportunities for
cooperation, it might also reflect a lack of serious interest in arms control.24 U.S. politicians, military leaders,
scientists and citizens were deeply divided over the extent to which nuclear weapons guaranteed or threatened
security.25 Faced with cautious cooperators’ ambivalence about nuclear weapons, the Department of Defense and
the Atomic Energy Commission used unobtainable verification demands to avert a “toboggan slide” toward
nuclear disarmament.26 Likewise, arguments about sovereignty kept inspectors out until the USSR built a
bomb of its own.
To American arms control advocates, a test ban offered an attractive way to appeal to cautious cooperators.
Compared with total disarmament, a CTB was a partial measure involving clear mutual benefits, yet relatively
low costs and risks. It would reduce fears about fallout, symbolize superpower cooperation, hamper
proliferation, and dampen the arms race. Banning tests carried few immediate costs; it would neither constrain
current military programs nor reduce nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the U.S. advantage in nuclear technology
minimized the risks of cheating. Soviet tests that could escape detection would not close the gap, while large
scale violations or sudden breakout would spur a U.S. response before the Soviets surged ahead.27
Proponents hoped that technology collaboration could produce a mutually-acceptable verification system if
superpower leaders really were cautious cooperators. A CTB poses three verification problems: detecting seismic
events; Determining their location; and discriminating between earthquakes, nuclear tests, and nonnuclear
explosions. The CIA doubted that the USSR could hide explosive yields above a few kilotons from the U.S.
test monitoring system.28 Technology collaboration could reduce residual concerns about verification in two
ways. Scientists could increase the accuracy of national verification systems by exchanging data on testing
practices and monitoring methods. They could also pool their technical knowledge to reach consensus on the
detection, discrimination, and location capabilities of different international verification arrangements.
Neither superpower initially supported test ban verification collaboration. Although the Soviets expressed
support for a CTB, they insisted that unilateral methods could “record any explosions of atomic and hydrogen
weapons, wherever they may be detonated.”29 U.S. military leaders rejected test limits because they wanted
“usable” nuclear weapons to compensate for Soviet conventional strength. Over time, though, President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles began to see test ban talks as a way to peek behind the
Iron Curtain, explore cooperative controls on the arms race, and increase domestic support for U.S. nuclear
policy. Faced with Khrushchev’s dramatic decision to suspend Soviet tests, Eisenhower invited East bloc
scientists to discuss monitoring requirements for a negotiated ban. Khrushchev’s proposal and Eisenhower’s
response fit the traditional pattern. The moratorium represented arms control without verification, while the
scientific conference involved verification research with no commitment to arms control. For various reasons,
though, both leaders were increasingly inclined to interpret each other’s behavior through the eyes of a cautious
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cooperator. In an unprecedented move, Khrushchev agreed to send delegates to Geneva in July 1958 to discuss
verification for a ban on nuclear tests.
At first, scientific collaboration seemed to have solved the disarmament deadlock. The Conference of
Experts unanimously concluded that 170 ground and ship-based control posts, plus inspections of ambiguous
events, offered a “workable and effective” way to detect and identify tests above 1 to 5 kilotons.30 When the
United States, USSR, and Britain agreed to start CTB negotiations, Eugene Rabinowitch declared that technical
collaboration had triumphed over politics:
Once an international problem has been formulated in scientifically significant terms, scientists from
all countries, despite their political or ideological backgrounds, will be able to find a common language
and arrive at an agreed solution.31
Once negotiations opened, participants realized that technical consensus had papered over political disputes.
The Geneva report said nothing about how many on-site inspections (OSIs) would occur. Nor did it specify who
would initiate OSIs, staff control posts and inspection teams, or evaluate compliance. Negotiating stances
reflected divergent concerns about spying and cheating. The USSR stressed confidence building: it minimized
intrusion and maximized Soviet involvement in decision making. The West denounced these plans as “self-
verification.” They emphasized information-gathering and minimized host country participation in verification
processes.
The West tried to prevail in these negotiations by portraying their verification preferences as scientifically-
necessary, and thus nonnegotiable. Dulles sent no senior diplomats to the Conference of Experts and told
delegates to treat their work “as a purely scientific, technical job.”32 The Soviets responded that the allocation of
verification benefits, costs, and risks was intensely political and eminently negotiable. They sought to minimize
monitoring and to ensure that verification authority would be shared. Khrushchev underscored the political nature
of verification by sending a leading diplomat to the Conference of Experts and treating the Geneva System as an
agreement not subject to unilateral revision. After data from U.S. tests in mid-1958 indicated that the Geneva
System’s identification threshold might be 20 kilotons rather than 5 kilotons, the West urged the USSR to
accept a partial ban, more control posts and OSIs, or further research on international monitoring.33 The USSR
responded by accusing the West of ratchetting up verification demands to spy and stall arms control.34 They also
observed that every proposed formula for calculating OSI quotas produced twenty annual inspections, and thus
dressed political preferences in scientific garb.35
As some U.S. policy makers grew more sensitive to Soviet concerns and more willing to reduce Western
verification demands in order to reach a test ban agreement, others continued to argue that arms control would
not serve U.S. interests unless monitoring capabilities could defeat any cheating scenario. When the State
Department favored an OSI quota rather than the right to inspect each suspicious event, the Atomic Energy
Commission called this a “technical issue” on which the stricter standards of its experts should prevail.36
Unilateralists from RAND and the weapons labs theorized endlessly about evasion scenarios such as reducing
seismic signals several hundred times by testing inside giant underground cavities.37 The “Big Hol ” theory
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implied that the Soviets could muffle the seismic waves from a 300 kiloton explosion to the point where the
Geneva System could not conclusively identify it as a nuclear test. Such analyses emphasized remote technical
possibilities and worst-case assumptions, but they generated anxiety among cautious cooperators and sapped
Congressional support for a CTB.38
By portraying extreme verification demands as scientifically correct, unilateralists increased cautious
cooperators’ resistance to compromises that met Soviet concerns. Lack of support for a proposed moratorium on
underground blasts with magnitudes below 4.75 on the Richter scale—about 20 kilotons for U.S. tests—while
the signatories conducted joint seismic research reflected Eisenhower’s belief that Western demands for twenty
annual OSIs had become a “political fact of life,” a sacrosanct symbol of rigor, and a requisite for ratification.39
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev offered three annual OSIs to indicate Soviet sincerity and increase
Senate support for a total ban. Despite Kennedy’s personal commitment to a CTB and his private regret that the
West had used improbable evasion scenarios to justify excessive OSI demands, he felt that he could not settle for
fewer than six inspections for fear that unilateralists and cautious cooperators would ally to block ratification.40
Tripartite talks ended with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which banned tests in the atmosphere, outer space,
and underwater, but allowed unlimited testing underground.
The LTBT represents a retreat from collaboration; verification is not mentioned because monitoring is
solely by national technical means (NTM).41 Signatories vowed to seek a CTB, yet the LTBT involved a
withdrawal from cooperative control of the arms race. Kennedy promised conservatives a “comprehensive,
aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test program” as insurance against cheating or treaty
abrogation.42 Thus, verification doubts minimized limits adopted in 1963 and created obstacles to a future CTB.
In short, early efforts to break the disarmament deadlock by using technological collaboration for test ban
verification failed to secure a CTB for two reasons. First, Western assertions that verification was a technical
problem of collecting compliance information gave little credence to Soviet concerns about the costs and risks
of intrusive verification. Claims that new data from one test series rendered the Geneva System inadequate
reinforced Soviet fears that technical analysis was an excuse for endless delays and new verification demands.
Second, by the time that the political leadership in the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR concurred
that broad limits on nuclear tests were mutually-desired and obtainable if they acknowledged each other’s
verification concerns, U.S. unilateralists had used scientific arguments and rigid verification requirements to
render any compromise treaties unratifiable.
Test Ban Cooperation and Controversy During the Rise and Fall of Détente
Détente was the time during the Cold War when one would expect the highest probability that technology
collaboration would secure a CTB. The offensive ceilings, antiballistic missile defense restrictions, and sole
reliance on national technical means of verification in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty indicated that
U.S. and Soviet leaders shared the basic beliefs of arms control advocates, at least in some issue areas. The
official policy of both superpowers claimed to want a CTB once verification disputes could be resolved and work
done during the 1960s suggested that answers were at hand.43 Yet, test ban technology collaboration achieved
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little more during the heyday of arms control than at the height of Cold War competition. The roots of failure
rest in decisions to use rigid and incompatible verification demands to finesse conflicting pressures from arms
control advocates and unilateralists. When superpower leaders decided to negotiate new limits on nuclear tests,
both sides made concessions to minimize the costs and risks of verification. But because U.S. leaders did not
popularize the notion of inevitable verification trade-offs, unilateralists could employ rigid verification demands
to alter the structure of test ban policy, to stall the second generation of CTB talks, and to convince cautious
cooperators that verification compromises in the TTBT and PNET made those agreements unratifiable.
Rather than using verification advances to secure stable cooperation in a mixed motive game, superpower
leaders juggled contradictory pressures to ban tests and to modernize arsenals by clinging to incompatible
verification demands. Neither side made a serious effort to see whether new seismic techniques and “invitational”
OSIs offered “win/win” solutions.44 By claiming to want cooperation and blaming the absence of real
constraints on the others’ unreasonable verification demands, leaders could appeal to cautious cooperators and
justify their dual-track policy as an unfortunate necessity, given an adversary who might exploit a CTB by
cheating or spying. This shifted attention from lack of serious negotiations to national verification research
programs. It also split the arms control community over tactics: should they push for CTB talks that might
never produce a ratifiable treaty; resolve CTB verification concerns before requesting negotiations; or demand an
immediate ban on all tests above the verification threshold?
When Nixon and Brezhnev needed a symbol of détente to sign at the Moscow summit, they chose a 150
kiloton limit on underground nuclear tests. This ceiling reflected weapon design requirements rather than
verification capabilities.45 Because no one doubted that national technical means could detect, identify, and
locate the source of large disturbances, the TTBT neither increased confidence in seismic verification nor
narrowed the gap on OSIs. Prohibiting only large tests created a new verification problem: yield measurement.
As we will see, the Reagan-era debate about Soviet TTBT compliance revolved around the extent to which
estimates based on U.S. tests would systematically exaggerate the size of Soviet blasts due to difference in test
site geology.46
In a situation where those who hold a benign view of verification would see little need for technology
collaboration, U.S. and Soviet negotiators worked together to reduce the risks and costs of verification. Since
neither side seemed strongly motivated to test over 150 kilotons, both deemed unilateral methods sufficient to
detect violations and deter cheating. To minimize potential political problems due to false alarms and wrongful
accusations, the TTBT protocol involved data exchanges to calibrate yield estimates—the first bilateral
verification cooperation beyond passive acceptance of NTM.47 To reduce fears about spying, though, the
protocol did not provide for independent measurements at each other’s test site to confirm yield data and
geological information. Furthermore, because new designs can produce larger than anticipated yields and random
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errors in seismic estimates can inflate some apparent yields, the delegation heads agreed that questionable cases
might require consultation, but that one or two “slight, unintended” breaches per year would not be violations.48
Negotiators spent eighteen months ensuring that groups of PNEs with high aggregate yields could be
conducted without TTBT compliance concerns.49 Du ing the late 1950s and 1960s, the US and USSR had
experimented with nuclear explosives for such purposes as excavating waterways, stimulating natural gas and oil
production, and creating large underground storage facilities. By the mid-1970s, the United States was backing
away from PNEs due to decreasing industrial interest and growing public concern about the environmental
consequences. The USSR, however, still saw PNEs as an interesting technology. The unprecedented Soviet
decision to tolerate OSIs on their territory reflected the recognition that seismic monitoring can neither
distinguish “civilian” from “military” explosions nor differentiate between three simultaneous 100 kiloton PNEs
and a single 300 kiloton explosion. Furthermore, since PNEs occur away from sensitive sites, the risks of
verification abuse are lower. Still, negotiators worried that inspections might reveal explosive design
information or interfere with PNE procedures. Therefore, they relied on cooperation during OSIs to minimize
both cheating and spying. For example, host country nationals take pictures and install yield estimation
equipment under the supervision of “designated personnel” from the other side. This OSI breakthrough had little
effect, though, because the United States conducted its last PNE in 1973 and the USSR ended group PNEs large
enough to trigger an inspection. Likewise, because the United States neither ratified nor rejected the TTBT for
fifteen years, the superpowers were legally obligated to observe the 150 kiloton limit but not to exchange data
needed to verify precisely their restraint.
Although nonratification did not involve serious doubts about TTBT verification, it did reflect discontent
that CTB verification concerns had been used to avoid difficult decisions about nuclear testing policy. Arms
control advocates and unilateralists attacked the TTBT in order to discredit the aspect of the dual track policy that
they disliked. CTB supporters such Senator John Glenn (D, Ohio) and MIT scientist George Rathjens, contended
that setting the threshold far above monitoring capabilities mocked U.S. claims to want a CTB once verification
problems were solved.50 CTB opponents worried that the TTBT might and increase pressure for lower limits on
underground tests.51 They employed a narrow construction of the verification problem to belittle the “Whoops
Clause”—their term for the understanding about the possibility of slight, unintended breaches—as legitimizing
violations and to discount the data exchange because it did not include independent validation of yield data. They
then utilized uncorrected yield estimates to claim Soviets violations of even the high limits of the TTBT.52 In
this environment, President Ford chose not to submit the treaties for ratification because he feared that Reagan
would use it as ammunition against Ford if Reagan sought the Republican nomination. Thus, treaties intended
as uncontroversial extensions of an ambivalent policy revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the two track
practice of advocating an “adequately verifiable CTB” while using rigid verification demands to delay serious
negotiations.
President Carter entered office committed to nuclear test restraint. Rather than trying to ratify minor treaties,
he hoped that a total ban could be built around ideas developed over the past decade by seismologists, the UN
Conference on Disarmament, and negotiators for the TTBT and PNET. The second generation of tripartite talks
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opened in October 1977. The United States, United Kingdom and USSR soon settled several issues, including
“invitational” OSIs, an International Seismic Data Exchange, and a PNE moratorium. Since regional signals
(seismic waves measured within 2,000 kilometers of the source) have a better signal to noise ratio than do
teleseismic signals (waves that travel more than 2,000 km) and are less affected by decoupling, the three states
agreed to establish National Seismic Stations (NSS) for in-country monitoring.53 Agreeme t on these issues
reflected a shared desire to find a CTB verification system that would detect, deter, and reassure without itself
posing unacceptable costs and risks.
Once again, groups opposed to a CTB used technical arguments to stall negotiations. Unilateralists
encouraged the directors from the national labs that build nuclear weapons to tell Carter that a ban would degrade
stockpile reliability. Judgments differ as to whether Carter came to believe that a CTB would reduce confidence
in retaliatory capabilities and destabilize deterrence. The visit, however, clearly increased Carter’s ambivalence by
underscoring unilateralist opposition to a CTB.54 In an attempt to appease his critics, Carter shifted from
supporting a permanent CTB to a three-year moratorium that exempted small nuclear experiments (this failed to
satisfy the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because they feared that public opinion would prevent renewed testing when the
three years were up). Concern about the Chinese nuclear program convinced the Soviets to support a short
trilateral moratorium while efforts were underway to bring the other nuclear weapons states on board, but hard-
liners argued against allowing NSS and OSI for anything short of a permanent ban.55 Inter al debate produced a
rigid stance: all signatories must accept the same number of stations. Insisting that Britain install ten NSS
seemed “to emphasize—with a vengeance—[the Soviet] view that verification is a political, not technical,
matter.”56 According to Herbert York, the Chief U.S. negotiator, this minor issue turned into a major impasse
because unilateralists in the United Kingdom and United States convinced Prime Ministers Callaghan and
Thatcher to accept only one NSS.57 egotiations continued until 1980, but the participants lacked the political
will to resolve this and other relatively minor verification disputes.
Reagan was unambiguously opposed to test ban cooperation when he entered office. He maintained that
arms control efforts had been fatally flawed because the Soviets preferred exploitation to arms control and would
cheat at every opportunity. He rejected the standard that “adequate” verification should detect militarily
significant violations. Instead, “effective” verification must provide unambiguous proof of all infractions.
Finally, he and the other unilateralists shaping official U.S. policy contended that arms control often hurt U.S.
security even when the Soviets complied.
Reagan withdrew from CTB talks and postponed TTBT ratification. He alleged “likely violations” of the
TTBT.58 Since seismic evidence was “not inconsistent” with these charges, but also not conclusive, Reagan
wanted more verification before sending the TTBT to the Senate.59 Finally, h  declared that a CTB was not now
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desirable ven if verification problems could be solved because deterrence required weapons development and
reliability tests.60
Reagan’s nuclear testing policy encountered strong domestic opposition. In the frigid climate of the early
1980s, conditioning a CTB on “effective” verification, sweeping nuclear arms reductions, balanced conventional
forces, and the obsolescence of nuclear deterrence seemed like saying “not in a million years.” This vision of
endless confrontation increased popular pressure for arms control. 54 percent of Americans opposed the decision
to suspend CTB negotiations, while only 42 percent supported it.61 Furth rmore, while many arms controllers
disliked the TTBT, they did not want false verification and compliance complaints used to torpedo this treaty or
to block lower limits.
Since Reagan used verification arguments against test limitations, arms control advocates counter-attacked
on technical grounds. Independent seismologists, such as Charles Archambeau, Jack Evernden, Lynn Sykes, and
Paul Richards, charged that Reagan’s policy rested on three unscientific estimation practices.62 First, claims that
some central yield values (the most likely actual yield of a test) exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold ignored
random fluctuations in seismic signals. If the same technique were applied to U.S. tests, equally many blasts
would seem to violate the TTBT.63
Second, gauging Soviet tests with an uncorrected magnitude to yield ratio from the Nevada Test Site (NTS)
systematically exaggerated Soviet yields by .3 to .4 orders of magnitude.64 The NTS method makes some
Soviet tests since 1976 appear as large as 650 kilotons, but a bias correction brings them into the range of
random scattering around 150 kilotons.65 After two noncompliance reports using the old methods, the CIA
updated its procedures in 1986.66 The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Department of
Defense (DOD), however, retained the NTS method. They altered or deleted sections of public hearings that
mentioned the revised compliance record.67
Third, they claimed that seismology was inherently imprecise. Official declarations that seismic monitoring
had a “factor of 2 uncertainty” meant that 95 percent of all yield estimates will be normally distributed in a range
from one half to two times the true amount. Test ban opponents distorted these statistics. For example, one
official testified that “a Soviet test for which we estimate a yield of 150 kilotons may have, with 95 percent
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probability, an actual yield as high as 300 kilotons—twice the legal limit—or as low as 75 kilotons.”68 Even
when used correctly, uncertainty estimates reflect political choices as well as technical capabilities. Arms control
advocates argued that uncertainty could be reduced to 1.5 by exchanging data and correcting biases or using more
than one type of seismic wave. Agreements to use in-country monitoring and test only in areas of known
geology could lower uncertainty still further.69
Reagan officials fought verification technology with verification technology. They cut funds for
seismology70 and promoted an on-site method called CORRTEX.71 Shock waves expand more quickly near
larger explosions. U.S. officials claimed that using CORRTEX at Soviet test facilities could lower uncertainty
to 1.3, although small location errors increase uncertainty to the factor of 2 associated with basic seismological
methods.72 They also asserted that CORRTEX was inherently better because hydrodynamic verification is
“direct” and seismic monitoring is “indirect,” even though both measure a signal that has traveled some distance
from its source.73
Three differences between hydrodynamic and seismic monitoring explain the unilateralists’ fondness for
CORRTEX.74 First, on-site methods multiply the costs and risks of arms control. CORRTEX monitors are
present for ten weeks before and during each test, while seismologists can work outside national boundaries or at
internal locations far from test facilities. To achieve 1.3 uncertainty, CORRTEX monitors also need detailed
data such as the degree to which the explosion is designed to be symmetrical or asymmetrical—information that
might reveal the purpose and/or performance of the test.75 Second, promoting CORRTEX would decrease
opposition to U.S testing policy. Since domestic arms control advocates and neutral countries can access
seismic data to refute TTBT noncompliance accusations, privileging a government-controlled mode of
verification would protect such charges. Promises to improve compliance information would appeal to cautious
cooperators who held a benign view of verification. Arguing about the relative merits of seismic and
hydrodynamic monitoring would waste arms control advocates’ time and energy, and make them fight a two-
front battle for intermediate limits and a total ban. Finally, seismic networks can detect extremely small tests
around the world, but CORRTEX is increasingly impractical for yields below 50 kilotons and useless for
unannounced tests. Establishing that seismology was insufficient at high yields would give unilateralists
precedents against future limits.76
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In short, key players in the Reagan administration preferred CORRTEX not because it improved compliance
information but because it raised the costs of high yield limits for the Soviets, undercut criticisms of current
testing policy, and set precedents that could prevent future administrations from concluding a low-yield limit or
comprehensive ban. Frank Gaffney, one of the architects of the Reagan administration’s unilateralist testing
policy, later acknowledged the motivation behind demands for this type of collaboration:
the more time wasted on discussions and experimentation of monitoring techniques irrelevant to the
verification of an environment in which there are no legal tests, the easier it will be to stave off
demands for the more constraining comprehensive test ban.77
The irony of test ban technology collaboration during détente is that it provided the tools that Reagan
unilateralists used to chip away at the TTBT and to build a barricade against a CTB. Those who were directly
involved in détente-era negotiations learned about both the other sides’ verification concerns and the practical
problems encountered when designing verification systems that are both workable and tolerable. Negotiators had
identified the verification issues that later became so controversial—unintended breaches, random fluctuations in
seismic signals, differences in signal propagation due to test site geology, and limitations of remote sensing
capabilities. For each issue, they crafted verification provisions that balanced the benefits of new information
against potential costs and risks. Yet, because nobody popularized this multi-faceted way of thinking about
verification, arms control critics could ridicule compromises as sacrificing rigorous verification to gain a weak
agreement. A narrow construction of verification became a potent and popular weapon in the Reagan-era
backlash against détente.
Competing Collaboration In the 1980s
By the end of Reagan’s first term, arms control prospects were bleak. Since the United States opposed a CTB
even if verification problems could be solved, the unilateralist structure of official policy suggests little role for
test ban technology collaboration. Yet, Reagan’s second term saw two unprecedented cooperative responses to
test ban verification arguments. The Natural Resources Defense Council joined with the Soviet Academy of
Sciences to establish in-country seismic monitoring stations near both sides’ test sites. This project was
designed to promote shared objectives: to reassure anxious Americans about Gorbachev’s intentions and U.S.
monitoring capabilities and to satisfy skittish Soviets about the value of verification (TTBT ratification and
CTB negotiation) relative to the low costs and risks of in-country seismic monitoring. By contrast, the United
States and Soviet governments conducted the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) for radically different reasons.
When transnational cooperation failed to alter U.S. nuclear testing policy, Gorbachev hoped that
intergovernmental collaboration would promote a CTB and seismic verification inside the domestic policy-
making processes of both superpowers. The Reagan administration, however, wished to weaken pressure for a
CTB by convincing cautious cooperators in the United States to insist on modest limits and intrusive
verification methods that the Soviets would resist. Comparing these competing projects shows how technical
collaboration can be used in strategies both to promote and to prevent arms control breakthroughs. It also
reveals the successes, limitations, and unintended effects of transnational and intergovernmental collaboration.
From Nuclear Stalemate to Collaborative Verification
Both the NRDC–SAS project and the JVE began as alternative responses to the opposition and ambivalence
generated by Reagan’s nuclear testing policies.
Reagan first suggested that U.S. and Soviet scientists experiment with hydrodynamic yield measurements at
each others’ test facilities in his September 1984 address to the U.N. General Assembly. The timing of this
invitation reflected an electoral strategy to tone down Reagan’s bellicose image. Congressional support for the
nuclear freeze, TTBT and PNET ratification, and new CTB talks showed that the Cold War rhetoric was
frightening voters, endangering defense spending, and eroding support for deterrence. By 1984, 69 percent of
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Americans favored a CTB.78 World opinion was also losing patience with the “game of disarmament.” The
leaders of six nonaligned states issued a declaration from New Delhi that called for a complete freeze on the
testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, while the neutral states at the Conference on
Disarmament refused to discuss test ban verification except in the context of work toward a CTB. Like Carter,
Reagan had become increasingly aware of domestic incentives and popular pressures that ran counter to his own
test ban preferences.79
Soon after coming to power, Gorbachev tried to generate new momentum for nuclear cooperation by
announcing a moratorium on Soviet nuclear tests as part of a package of arms control initiatives.80 He conceded
to U.S. demands on START, INF, SDI, and chemical weapons, but used the moratorium to increase popular
pressure against U.S. testing policy. The 1985 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, for example, almost
collapsed over nuclear testing. The United States and United Kingdom were harshly criticized by nonaligned
states like Mexico, but the USSR, less than one month into their moratorium, escaped unscathed.81
In a third-party maneuver to magnify the impact of the moratorium, the New Delhi Six offered to help the
superpowers set up in-country seismic stations and to place monitoring devices on their own territory.82 Several
of the American scientists most opposed to Reagan’s test ban policy had helped devise this collaborative
proposal. Monitoring a relatively short moratorium would be technically and politically easier than verifying a
CTB, they argued, because one need worry only about preexisting test sites. With narrower goals and needs,
moratorium monitoring should spark fewer fears about cheating or spying. Scientists could see how new
seismic techniques functioned “in the field” so that diplomats would not need to negotiate and implement a full-
blown system based on unproved technology.83
Gorbachev’s favorable response to the New Delhi Six was one of many indications of increased Soviet
flexibility on verification.84 This shift started as early as 1982, when Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested that
part of the Soviet peaceful nuclear program might be opened to International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards.85 At the 1985 Geneva Summit, Gorbachev agreed to discuss arms control and verification
simultaneously. He also promised that the Soviet Union would pose no verification problems if the
superpowers agreed to end nuclear tests. Avowals that verification issues must not preclude cooperation filled his
major disarmament speech on January 15, 1986. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze sounded like a true arms control
advocate when he announced that the problem of verification “is nonexistent now” because the USSR was ready
for international monitoring and OSIs, as well as NTM.86
Gorbachev’s decision to champion collaborative verification, like earlier Soviet opposition to intrusive
monitoring, can be understood in several ways. The Reagan administration depicted it as further evidence of
Soviet duplicity: Gorbachev was not serious about arms control, but hoped to put the burden of noncooperation
on the United States by offering radical sounding verification for treaties that Reagan would never accept. A
more neutral explanation emphasized a tactical shift rather than a new approach to verification. In this
interpretation, the USSR might accept more monitoring than it deemed necessary because it knew the political
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value of verification for the United States, but it would exploit each verification concession for maximum
negotiating leverage. A third view saw Gorbachev’s statements as evidence of a new-found belief that secrecy
fuels the arms race and that cooperation requires widespread access to accurate compliance information. In
retrospect, each interpretation holds some validity, with the mix of motives depending on the issue at stake.87
At the time, though, Gorbachev’s offers for collaborative verification exacerbated U.S. domestic debates about
his intentions instead of convincing Americans that he sincerely sought stable arms control cooperation.
U.S. unilateralists ridiculed the proposal. National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane accused the Soviets
of conducting a “flurry” of tests before the moratorium, although the nine tests in 1985 were only one third of
the known Soviet annual average since 1978.88 A closed society, ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman argued,
could conduct clandestine tests or secret preparations for a breakout.89 A moratori m would also halt vital U.S.
research on strategic defense, accurate warheads, and communication during nuclear war.90 Thus, Gorb chev’s
proposal would undermine “the safety, reliability, effectiveness, and credibility of our nuclear deterrent which
keeps the peace.”91
Reagan repeated Eisenhower’s response that joint efforts to improve verification would be safer and more
meaningful than a testing moratorium. The day that Gorbachev announced his halt, the United States invited
Soviet scientists to observe a CORRTEX display “as a demonstration of our seriousness.”92 Th  USSR refused
because watching CORRTEX might condone testing, postpone CTB talks, and legitimize criticisms of seismic
monitoring.93 It wanted the treaties ratified and implemented as negotiated, saying that further verification
should be discussed only if original arrangements proved inadequate.94
Despite this damage control, the Soviet moratorium posed a public relations problem for Reagan. Voters
were intensely concerned about nuclear weapons, but attitudes toward testing revealed deep contradictions. Before
the Geneva Summit, 60 percent of respondents thought that Gorbachev’s initiatives were meant to influence
world opinion, but only fourteen percent saw real interest in major arms reductions.95 Still, majorities in four
polls between August 1985 and April 1986 would reciprocate Soviet restraint.96 Preferences cut across party
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lines; 51 percent of Republicans wanted to join the moratorium, while only 43 percent agreed with Reagan’s
position.97 Yet, nuclear ambivalence remained. Most respondents considered arms control very important, but
few believed that recent negotiations had reduced the chance of nuclear war. Additionally, more respondents feared
that war would result from loss of U.S. nuclear strength than from continuing the arms race.98
Arms control advocates of the mid-1980s faced a situation much like the disarmament deadlock of the
1950s. Superpower leaders espoused extreme verification demands and blamed each other for negotiating failures.
U.S. citizens questioned the motivations behind both leaders’ positions on verification, longed for a cooperative
response to the dangers of deterrence, yet worried that arms control might advantage the other side. In the past,
widespread ambivalence and ignorance had minimized the impact of public opinion on nuclear policy. Yet, the
Nuclear Freeze movement was breaking through this paralyzing doubt. Cautious cooperators constituted a
potential pool of support for a CTB if activists could inform and energize them.99
Arms control advocates longed for a national debate to determine the amount of information needed to
detect, deter, and reassure so that cautious cooperators could differentiate between sincere and cynical verification
demands. Yet, this question was rarely discussed in depth because it involved complex judgments about arms
control, nuclear strategy, Soviet intentions, and verification functions.100 Debate often deteriorated into
arguments over minimalist and maximalist views of deterrence or adversarial and cooperative conceptions of the
USSR. Each side accused the other of rigging verification criteria to produce their preferred arms control
outcome.101 The main questions were frequently avoided because the Cold War climate and the benign view of
verification left those who questioned extreme verification vulnerable to charges of being naive, irresponsible
guardians of US security.102
Much of the debate, therefore, focused on three safer and more technical issues. Had the USSR violated the
TTBT? Could seismology achieve a factor of 1.3 uncertainty without excessive intrusion and expense? Finally,
could the USSR show that it was sincere about underground test limits without accepting CORRTEX? The
NRDC–SAS seismic monitoring project and the U.S.–Soviet JVE gave different answers to these questions.
Both argued that joint research could break the test ban deadlock, and both sought to control the informative and
the symbolic functions of cooperative verification. In short, both tried to use technical collaboration for political
purposes, the first to promote far-reaching new limits on nuclear tests and the second to prevent them.
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The NRDC–SAS In-Country Seismic Monitoring Project
Spurred by a sense of responsibility for the development of nuclear weapons and a belief that scientific
knowledge transcends national borders, arms control advocates and cautious cooperators in the scientific
community have had a long history of transnational collaboration. In addition to government-sponsored events,
like the Conference of Experts and the technical working groups at the U.N., private organizations such as the
international Pugwash movement and the Federation of American Scientists have a long history of bringing
scientists together to talk about the arms race and to explore approaches to arms control verification. Interactions
among U.S. and Soviet scientists usually focused on the exchange of technical information, although back-
channel discussions about the destabilizing effects of antiballistic missile defenses may have contributed to the
Soviet decision to sign SALT I.103 Two events, a 1983 conference on Nuclear Winter and the 1986 accident at
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, brought increased openness and a greater sense of urgency to these efforts.
The NRDC, a large American environmental advocacy organization composed primarily of scientists and
lawyers, grew interested in seismic verification while publishing nuclear test data as part of a project to educate
citizens about technical aspects of weapons development and arms control. At the time, the U.S. government
only announced some of its tests.104 The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) collected data from many other
seismic events, but did not identify any of them as secret tests. Even less was known about the Soviet program
because the USSR had never announced its tests and Soviet seismologists either turned off their equipment or
had their data confiscated.105 In January 1986, the NRDC pieced together enough information to estimate the
number of secret U.S. tests and to show that some, but not all, had probably been detected by the USGS or a
seismic array located in Sweden.106 From this analysis, they argued that existing seismic systems could reliably
detect underground tests at NTS above one to three kiloton and that dedicated seismic stations could lower the
threshold still further.
NRDC members joked about putting a station near the NTS, but worried that it might seem “unpatriotic
for NRDC unilaterally to release information which the US government was, for some reason, keeping
secret . . .”107 In February 1986, Thomas Cochran, a senior scientist at the NRDC, began working on a plan
for nongovernmental scientists in the US and USSR to monitor jointly the presence or absence of nuclear tests
in each country. Since monitoring around NTS could occur on private land, the project would not require U.S.
government support, beyond granting visas for Soviet scientists to come to the United States and export
licenses for equipment shipped to the USSR. When Cochran and NRDC Chairman Adrian Dewind discussed the
idea with Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, he expressed concern about how the project related to
official U.S. testing policy, but did not oppose the effort.108
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Collaboration to demonstrate and improve seismic monitoring technology, appealed to reform-minded
Soviet leaders for many reasons. Gorbachev wanted to connect new thinkers in the East and the West at a time
when many Americans were still in “evil empire mode.”109 Letting Western scientists monitor the absence of
testing would rebut charges that the new openness was a public relations gambit and the moratorium a ploy.
Joint seismic monitoring could also buttress the Soviet position that on-site verification was superfluous for
TTBT ratification and CTB negotiation.
Arms control advocates in the Soviet Union envisioned international technology collaboration as a tool to
influence internal policy-making processes of both superpowers. Yevgeny Velikhov, vice-president of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences and Gorbachev’s unofficial science adviser, invited U.S. scientists to a seismic verification
symposium in May, 1986, where he embraced the most “political” suggestion—the Cochran plan to put three
stations near the test site in Kazakhstan and Nevada.110 Desire for a quick and visible test ban breakthrough
explains why Velikhov wanted the NRDC–SAS project to start by the end of June—barely a month away.111
He knew that Congress would vote in August on a one kiloton moratorium as part of the FY87 defense
authorization bill. Velikhov also expected that Soviet hard-liners would try to block an extension when their
moratorium expired that same month.
American participants in the NRDC project had several motives. For leading seismologists who agreed to
operate the seismic stations in the USSR, the initial attraction was to “do good science”—that is to collect new
data relevant to the TTBT compliance controversy and the CTB verification debate. Measuring waves that have
traveled from U.S. tests to seismic stations in Kazakhstan provides data about signal attenuation between the
United States and USSR. If the stations could record when the Soviet Union resumed testing, scientists could
also compare regional waves with signals measured at teleseismic distances. Cochran saw the project as a form
of hypothesis testing: since Gorbachev maintained that access would not be a problem for CTB verification and
Reagan insisted that verification remained a major obstacles, requesting permission for in-country monitoring
stations provided an “opportunity to make a liar out of one of them.”112 For Jacob Scherr, the NRDC lawyer
who led the project with Cochran, the primary purpose was to change public perceptions of the Soviet Union: if
Gorbachev was really willing to allow the stations—and many people at the NRDC doubted that he actually
would—then a dramatic demonstration of this new openness would reassure cautious cooperators in a way that
words alone never could.113 For this reason, the stations were located “right on the doorstep” of the main Soviet
test facility, ready to detect tiny explosions should the USSR violate its own moratorium.114
To start monitoring by the end of June, the NRDC had a month in which to raise over a million dollars,
select equipment, secure export licenses, and convince scientists to participate.115 They su ceeded, in part
because they found official allies who shared their objectives and could expedite arrangements. According to
Philip Schrag, some members of the State Department saw the project as a way to end the TTBT compliance
controversy, to set useful verification precedents, to learn about short-range seismic monitoring, and to refine
U.S. negotiating positions.116 Whitehead quietly assigned a liaison and expedited export licenses for the project.
He did not, however, want his agency publicly associated with efforts to reverse U.S. policy. State officials were
told to answer questions about the NRDC project by applauding Soviet willingness to share additional
verification data, while questioning the merits of an asymmetrical arrangement between scientists sponsored by
the Soviet government and a private organization acting in opposition to official U.S. policy:
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because effective verification is a matter that can only be resolved at the government-to-government
level, one would expect the Soviets—if indeed they are serious regarding verification
improvements—to accept the standing US invitation for a meeting of US and Soviet government
experts to discuss verification improvements for the TTBT and PNET.117
After the NRDC team arrived in Moscow in July, Velikhov encountered resistance from the Soviet Foreign
Ministry and Ministry of Defense who opposed granting official permission for the Americans to go near the
Soviet test site. Velikhov was instructed to circulate an issue paper among the senior Soviet policy makers, but
failed to do so, due perhaps to confusion in the decision-making process or to a conscious decision to postpone
debate until the NRDC had arrived. The Americans waited in Moscow for four days while, Velikhov (who was
hospitalized) argued that sending them home now would create a major public embarrassment. Since the
military’s concern dealt with monitoring once the test moratorium was over, the stand-off was resolved after the
NRDC representatives signed a document which said that monitoring a Soviet nuclear test was not essential to
the purpose of their project.
The onset of in-country monitoring produced an upsurge of U.S. support for arms control. Publicity shots
of U.S. seismologists working in Kazakhstan provided tangible evidence of glasnost in action. As Jacob Scherr
put it, once the NRDC took New York Times reporters, television crews, and National Geographic
photographers to Semipalatinsk, U.S. conservatives could not easily ignore or dismiss the moratorium.118 On
August 8th, the House voted 234 to 155 to withhold funds for nuclear tests above one kiloton for a year if the
USSR reciprocated and permitted in-country seismic verification. Chris Paine, the staffer for Senator Ted
Kennedy who led the push for a one kiloton moratorium, believes that a well-orchestrated series of briefings
about the NRDC project and display set up in the lobby on the day of the House vote helped the measure to
pass by the largest margin of any arms control vote in Congress. The key to victory, according to Paine, was
that supporters made openness and verification, not test limitations per se, the focus of the vote.119
Unilateralists in the Reagan administration worried about how the NRDC project would affect public
support for nuclear testing. Their concerns increased when they saw that the Soviets would allow in-country
monitoring and that this could convince Congress to cut off funds for most nuclear tests. Richard Perle, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, led the charge. As one of Perle’s assistants said:
the NRDC’s goals were totally the opposite of our own. They went into this project to prove that a
CTB is verifiable [and we’d made verification into the main public objection to a CTB because]
verification is such a “show stopper,” as Richard Perle is fond of saying.120
A Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) memorandum written soon after the NRDC–SAS
agreement was signed shows how much importance unilateralists placed on convincing cautious cooperators that
“effective” verification must involve intrusive monitoring even for very high yield limits.121 Any response, the
memo declared, should serve two policy objectives: the promotion of current U.S. testing policy and the
reduction of influence, propaganda value, or political gains for the USSR. The authors argued that in-country
monitoring would provide unreliable information because the USSR could locate the seismic stations in noisy
or unrepresentative locations. Nevertheless, they expected arms control advocates to interpret ambiguous data as
evidence to support their claims for seismic capabilities. The real danger was that the project could convince
cautious cooperators that the Soviets would now accept exacting verification demands. It might “divert attention
from, or claim to be a substitute for, the standing U.S. proposal to make CORRTEX measurements on nuclear
tests. It will be hard for the public to distinguish between an essentially irrelevant and a highly valuable
measurement program.” Thus, the administration faced a delicate situation. It could try to delay exports, discredit
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NRDC scientists, and distance itself from the project, but it wanted to avoid heavy-handed tactics that could be
portrayed as intransigence on test ban verification.122
For a variety of legal, practical, and political reasons, Perle focused on the issue of visas for SAS members
to visit the United States The State Department wanted to reciprocate Soviet openness by granting unconditional
visas. Perle saw “the second level issue of how to react to the NRDC project, and particularly whether to grant
the visas” as a surrogate for disputes between Defense and State over general nuclear testing policy.123 The
Department of Defense, therefore, insisted that SAS members come only as government officials and solely to
observe a CORRTEX demonstration. Rather than debate the real issue, the National Security Council (NSC)
staff minimized interagency conflict by “splitting the difference.” SAS members could make an official visit,
watch CORRTEX, and go wherever else they wished, or be guests of the NRDC on highly restricted visas.
Because the Soviets chose the second option, they were denied visas that would permit them to visit potential
seismic monitoring sites in the United States The project was saved only because SAS scientists selected their
monitoring sites based on geological maps, photos, and rock samples; and analyzed data sent to the Soviet
Union.
Internal opposition was weaker in the USSR because the project suited Gorbachev’s policy objectives and
public diplomacy strategy.124 Conservative Politburo members objected that the SAS had bypassed formal
negotiations and encroached on their turf.125 Some traditionalists had trouble tolerating the new openness in
Soviet verification policy.126 The loudest outcry came from critics of unilateral test restraint. When asked about
the moratorium in August 1986, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev hinted that the military would not tolerate much
longer the “damage” done by unreciprocated restraint.127Each U.S. test created new objections to Gorbachev’s
public diplomacy strategy.128
Arms control opponents in both countries reinforced each others’ efforts to restrict collaboration, while
NRDC–SAS participants searched for creative responses. When Congress dropped test restrictions from the
defense authorization bill and the Reykjavik summit floundered over SDI, Gorbachev bowed to hard-line
pressure: the moratorium would end after the first U.S. nuclear blast in 1987. This occurred on February 3rd,
less than two weeks before the NRDC started full-scale monitoring at Semipalatinsk. In the same month, the
NSC again refused to grant an unrestricted visa unless the Soviet team watched a CORRTEX demonstration
(this time, the SAS declined to come at all). These events must have made arguments that Soviet verification
concessions would not secure a CTB seem increasingly plausible to cautious cooperators in the USSR. Soviet
domestic politics, Scherr believes, explains why the NRDC was told to stop monitoring before the Soviet test
on February 26th. “A lot of chits had been used up by Gorbachev in enforcing the moratorium for eighteen
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months—he wasn’t willing to spill any more blood over keeping the equipment on.”129 U.S. officials used the
shut-down request as evidence that Gorbachev never was serious about in-country monitoring for anything short
of a total ban, while the NRDC tried to put the situation in a positive light by claiming credit for the first
public notification of an impending Soviet test.
The renegotiation of the NRDC–SAS agreement in June 1987 suggests that domestic politics in both states
convinced Gorbachev to shift his test ban strategy. After the House voted again for a one kiloton moratorium
(234 for, 187 against), the USSR extended the NRDC–SAS project for fourteen months. According to SAS
members, though, lack of reciprocal access had strengthened hard-liners.130 NRDC members hoped that moving
their stations 600 miles away from Semipalatinsk would help convince the military to accept monitoring during
nuclear tests. NRDC scientists also wanted to enlarge the network as a foundation for the 20 to 30 in-country
seismic stations that Charles Archambeau had suggested for CTB verification. Gorbachev allowed the NRDC to
relocate its three existing stations, build two new ones, and monitor during Soviet tests, so long as they left
daily operations to Soviet nationals. Off-site monitoring had less media value in the United States, but did set
important precedents for in-country monitoring of an active testing program in the USSR.
This decision signaled a shift in Soviet test ban strategy because monitoring an active test program provide
facilities and practical experience needed for a low-yield threshold treaty.131 As unilateral initiatives and
independent collaboration failed to alter U.S. testing policy, Gorbachev began using public diplomacy less to
push for a total ban and more to facilitate intergovernmental negotiations over step-by-step limits that the
Reagan administration preferred. Since July 1986, the superpowers had held “expert-level discussions” on test
ban verification questions. Early meetings involved predictable sparring. U.S. delegates used various “cheating
scenarios” to justify CORRTEX. Soviet scientists objected that a system to detect improbable forms of
noncompliance would institutionalize “mutual distrust” that ignore important tradeoffs between accuracy (high
detection and low false alarm rate), nonintrusiveness (low collateral information), and practicality (low expense
and inconvenience).132 But as they learned that seismic collaboration could not overcome U.S. insistence on
CORRTEX as the price for TTBT ratification, Soviet scientists began to ask more detailed questions and
consider the tradeoffs more carefully.133 Rather than renew an unreciprocated moratorium, Gorbachev agreed to
“step by step” negotiations but insisted that a CTB should be a near-term goal, not a by-product of nuclear
obsolescence. The two countries argued for nearly a year about the name and agenda for the meetings. Finally, in
September 1987, they agreed to start “Nuclear Testing Talks” (NTT) to draft new verification protocols for the
TTBT and PNET, pursue intermediate limits, and progress toward a CTB.
Meanwhile, another component of the NRDC–SAS project, seismic monitoring of simulated nuclear
blasts, was generating useful data without altering U.S policy. In September 1987, three days before the Senate
reconsidered a one kiloton moratorium, an NRDC–SAS team detonated three chemical blasts near
Semipalatinsk. They showed that regional monitoring could detect a decoupled one kiloton explosion and that
the NTS formula exaggerated Soviet yields. When an earthquake near New Zealand shook the seismometers
before the third detonation, the collaborators obtained striking evidence against the “hide in an earthquake”
cheating scenario because the big earthquake and the small explosion generated very different signals.134 The
USSR also invited U.S. Congressmen and NRDC experts to tour the Krasnoyarsk radar, site of an alleged
violation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Neither the verification breakthroughs nor the Krasnoyarsk visit
changed Senate unilateralists’ attitude toward a short moratorium. Even many moderates who supported the
amendment in 1986 voted against a ban in 1987 because official efforts now seemed like they might produce
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results.135 In Scherr’s words, the “window of public diplomacy” closed in September 1987. The Reagan
administration had moved just enough to mollify cautious cooperators in Congress but not enough to sustain
Gorbachev’s grassroots strategy against his internal critics.
Soviet willingness to discuss testing on the Reagan administration’s terms gave U.S. unilateralists a new
incentive to obstruct the NRDC–SAS collaboration. The day after the INF treaty was signed, Gorbachev and
Reagan agreed to monitor an explosion at each others’ test site. While the United States planned to showcase
CORRTEX, the USSR hoped to demonstrate that seismology could out-perform hydrodynamic methods with
less intrusion and expense. Advance visits by SAS scientists to seismic stations around NTS could improve the
accuracy of in-country monitoring for the JVE. The NSC denied a third visa request even though the Soviets
now agreed to watch CORRTEX.
SAS members finally visited NRDC stations in the United States after the resignations of Perle, Gaffney,
and Weinberger left DOD less inclined to block visas in order to protect current testing policy.136 Th  House
voted for a testing halt again in April 1988, shortly after the SAS team established the first Soviet-equipped and
operated seismic stations in the United States A day later, three small chemical blasts in Nevada were recorded
by the new Soviet stations, three permanent NRDC sites, and 150 seismometers hundreds of miles away. One
optimistic observer declared:
The world had changed. No more could governments pretend that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
would be unverifiable . . . The NRDC has given hope . . . by showing that determined private citizens
can lead even superpower governments out of the deadly traps they fashion for themselves.137
Janne Nolan of the Brookings Institution, by contrast, believes that the NRDC failed to change either
public attitudes or official policy. In fact, nongovernmental collaboration may have reduced support for arms
control:
efforts such as [seismic monitoring and the Krasnoyarsk visit] have not enjoyed broad political support
or helped dispel suspicion among critics . . . Partly this has been due to the composition of the
delegations, which have not been bipartisan. More important, it reveals the inherent limits of unofficial
site visits. If anything, these citizen-diplomat efforts have intensified conservatives’ fears that on-site
inspections are a new weapon in the Soviet arsenal of propaganda and deception.138
What exactly did the NRDC–SAS collaboration accomplish? If one assesses the project in terms of three
objectives—to promote and improve in-country seismic monitoring technology, to influence internal debates
over nuclear testing policy, and to move the world closer to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—a complex
picture emerges. Project leaders were most successful when they had official allies who wanted to promote
policy objectives through nongovernmental channels. Where the NRDC used transnational collaboration to
undercut national leaders, though, they could place issues on the agenda and challenge misinformation used to
justify official policy, but they could not convince cautious cooperators that the collaborators’ intentions were
benign.
The NRDC–SAS project collected important data on high frequency waves and signal attenuation, yet the
regional findings had to be analyzed in conjunction with global seismic data from other sources to minimize
accusations that evidence which contradicted current policy lacked scientific objectivity. For example, when the
Office of Technology Assessment proposed a project to evaluate seismic verification capabilities, some
Congressmen on its board feared that this subject would be too “political” for a technical agency. They agreed to
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support the project only after the Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) director promised not to focus overly
much on the NRDC data.139 Cochran, the scientist most responsible for in-country seismic monitoring in the
USSR, did not participate in the study, nor were any contributors explicitly linked to the NRDC project.
Instead, the workshops and advisory panel included a range of independent scientists and representatives from
DOE, DOD, and the Intelligence Community. The report on “Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing”
concurred with the NRDC’s main technical conclusions: it found no evidence of TTBT violations; it determined
that CORRTEX offered little, if any, advantage over sophisticated seismology; and it concluded that high-quality
internal seismic system could monitor a ban on tests above 5 kilotons. Despite these careful attempts at
consensus-building, the report still encountered harsh criticism from test ban opponents when it was released in
May 1988.140
The NRDC–SAS collaboration also had mixed success at increasing interest in seismic verification. Since
Gorbachev wanted to show that seismology was sufficient for a CTB, the project fostered links between SAS
scientists and Soviet military seismologists.141 Excitement generated by the project also led to a “blossoming”
of interest in seismic verification among independent scientists in the West.142 U.S. government scientists, by
contrast, were explicitly told to “keep their hands off” the NRDC project because it was a “political hot
potato.”143 DOE, DARPA, and the USGS. all expressed interest in 1985 when Jack Evernden first mentioned
the possibility of putting in-country seismic stations in the USSR, but quickly distanced themselves from the
high-profile project run by an independent group opposed to U.S. policy.144By making their data public,
NRDC seismologists created openings for tacit collaboration with like-minded scientists inside the government.
Archambeau and Paine also devised a complicated plan whereby DARPA could fund the in-country network’s
operation and expansion without openly undercutting the Reagan administration stance on seismic
verification.145
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Increased openness and more accurate verification information may have expanded diffuse support for
cooperation, but they did not decrease cautious cooperators’ ambivalence about arms control. Popular
perceptions of U.S.–Soviet relations brightened dramatically during the NRDC–SAS project. The percentage of
respondents who thought that relations were stable or improving increased from 37 in October 1986 to 90 in
July 1988.146 Support for a CTB remained relatively high but unchanged, at 69 percent in 1984 and 67 percent
in 1987.147 Furthermore, even after NRDC scientists were allowed to monitor simulated nuclear blasts at
Semipalatinsk, 68 percent of Americans still believed that “we cannot trust what Soviet leaders say.”148 Thus,
technical collaboration did not translate into more faith in Gorbachev’s arms control intentions or greater
support for a specific nuclear accord.
The NRDC project brought verification to the forefront of Congressional deliberations in ways that
perpetuated the conflict between those who wanted far-reaching limits on nuclear tests and those who supported
the President’s position. Many House members used the project as evidence that the Soviets would cooperate to
improve test verification.149 A Congress Research Service report applauded the project but questioned it
relevance for intergovernmental agreements because “welcoming a private group that advocated negotiations
toward a CTB does not necessarily imply readiness to welcome an official group that may be perceived as
adversarial and primarily interested in detecting violations.”150 Most Congressional Republicans, by contrast,
refused to reduce Reagan’s negotiating leverage when the Soviets were making concessions or to reward
Gorbachev for collaborating with Reagan’s critics.151
These conflicts produced weak test ban legislation. Even before the NRDC project, Congress had passed
nonbinding legislation urging the President to submit the TTBT and PNET for ratification and to resume CTB
talks.152 In return for dropping the one kiloton moratorium amendment before the Reykjavik summit, Reagan
promised to submit the TTBT and PNET once verification issues were resolved and then immediately invite the
USSR to begin step-by-step negotiations aimed ultimately at a ban on nuclear tests. Despite two more House
votes for a moratorium, the Senate never withheld funds for nuclear tests in the 1980s. The few binding
measures that survived both Houses involved “apple pie” issues that arms control advocates, cautious
cooperators, and unilateralists all could support, such as increased funds for seismic research and studies about
stockpile reliability.
In sum, “direct action” and “citizen to citizen” collaboration in the NRDC–SAS project had mainly indirect
effects on test ban cooperation. In-country seismic monitoring kept nuclear test limits on the public agenda by
providing a series of dramatic demonstrations that verification problems could be resolved. These visible,
understandable counter arguments to claims that the Soviets had violated the TTBT and would oppose all
intrusive verification for a CTB, made it harder for Reagan to avoid nuclear testing negotiations altogether. The
project also may have encouraged Gorbachev to return to resume test ban negotiations. Evidence that in-country
monitoring need not involve espionage, interference, and increased international tension helped him reassure
cautious cooperators and rebut Soviet unilateralists. At the same time, it convinced Gorbachev that unilateral
restraint and grassroots pressure could not secure new test limits based on seismic verification alone.
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Intergovernmental Negotiation and the Joint Verification Experiment
In contrast to the NRDC–SAS project, where the collaborators shared many common goals, the JVE involved
ongoing arguments about the objectives, procedures, results, and implications of intergovernmental
collaboration. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze initiated the JVE to demonstrate improvements in seismic
verification. The USSR invited the United States to take local and regional data along with hydrodynamic
measurements, but the United States refused—to the dismay of U.S. seismologists, and even the CIA.153Before
the JVE, the two countries exchanged data covered by the 1974 TTBT protocol and information about five
historic nuclear tests. The Soviets were willing to accept a few data exchanges and hydrodynamic calibration of
yield information to improve seismic CTB monitoring, still argued that routine OSIs need not be a regular
feature of TTBT verification.
Once the Soviets agreed to watch CORRTEX, Reagan officials quickly tried to lower expectations. They
repeatedly stated that “one data point” could neither resolve TTBT compliance concerns nor increase confidence
in low yield limits.154 Instead, the U.S. objective for the JVE was to convince the USSR that on-site
monitoring would not compromise military secrets.155 In January 1988, twenty experts visited the other’s site
to learn about testing practices. Then, negotiators hammered out a hundred page protocol which, the U.S hoped,
would enable 140 Americans to live and work at the Soviet test range for several months without incident. But
in July, three members of the U.S. preparation team were caught secretly shipping home soil samples, rocks,
and other prohibited material. U.S. officials called the situation “embarrassing” but portrayed it as “unauthorized
souvenir collecting” rather than espionage.156 Although the incident did not derail the JVE, it substantiated fears
that CORRTEX was an excuse for collateral information collection and demonstrated that meticulous treaty
language could prevent friction and ambiguity during the verification process.
The first JVE explosion occurred at NTS on August 17, 1988, and the second transpired at Semipalatinsk
four weeks later. Both sides took hydrodynamic measurements, while the NRDC–SAS stations monitored
regional waves and international seismologists watched for teleseismic signals. The participants prepared a joint
report detailing agreed data and technical disagreements, but the U.S. side was instructed not to sign.157 Both
governments called the JVE a success, but only the USSR agreed to publicize the results. Because neither side
could release data unless both agreed, the United States blocked revelations which might “limit the range of
options and tactics” for NTT negotiators.158
Data leaks suggest three reasons why the U.S. government refused to provide its own citizens with
information given to the USSR.159 Leading newspapers printed reports that the true yield at NTS was in the
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mid-140s. NRDC–SAS seismologists judged the yield to be 139 kilotons, while three hydrodynamic estimates
put the size at 155, 163, and 170 kilotons.160 If these figures are correct, the first implication is that in-country
seismic monitoring could be more accurate than any hydrodynamic method while costing much less than the
$28 million spent by the United States on the JVE. Second, the results illustrate the danger of ignoring the
uncertainty inherent in all verification. An unsophisticated reading of the hydrodynamic results implies that the
United States violated the TTBT. Yet, all four estimates fall well within the 1.3 uncertainty range for a 145
kiloton test.161 Third, teleseismic monitoring confirmed that the NTS formula systematically over-estimated
Soviet yields. The magnitude of the shot at Semipalatinsk would be equivalent to a 350 kiloton blast at NTS.
Yet, regional seismic signals and Soviet hydrodynamic measurements suggest a yield in the mid-120s, while
CORRTEX registered 115 kilotons. For CTB-supporters, these leaks reinforced concern that CORRTEX was a
“needlessly complex and circuitous assault on a largely manufactured problem.”162
C. Paul Robinson, the head of the American NTT delegation, interpreted the results quite differently. He
portrayed the JVE as a “trial run” which showed that the superpowers co ld use hydrodynamic equipment at each
others’ test sites, and thus sho ld routinely do so. Asked to compare seismic and hydrodynamic methods, he
spoke only of early teleseismic estimates that the NTS was 80 to 100 kilotons and suggested that the Soviets
were rethinking their reliance on seismic verification. He ignored the OTA findings and asserted that seismology
had an uncertainty of 1.7 or 1.75, far greater than the 1.3 claimed for CORRTEX. Rather than discuss what the
JVE said about past TTBT compliance, he insisted on CORRTEX to avoid future false alarms.163Finally, he
predicted that the new TTBT protocol could be drafted quickly and precisely since the detailed JVE provisions had
been field-tested and potential problems corrected.164
The two year delay before TTBT ratification indicates that conflicts continued between the superpowers and
inside the U.S. government. As the Conference of Experts showed, scientific collaboration cannot transcend
controversy unless participants share principles with which to interpret evidence. “Consensual knowledge” was
missing here.165 As one senior U.S. official said at the end of NTT in December 1988, “the experiments
essentially convinced each side that their own approach is best. We seem to be stuck.”166
The JVE convinced some proponents of U.S. nuclear testing to ally with arms control advocates who
argued that routine use of CORRTEX would be overly expensive, intrusive, and inconvenient. Before the JVE,
the CIA had warned that “if the Soviets said ‘yes’ to our initial proposals, we would be in trouble” because the
United States had not considered the costs and risks of admitting foreign inspectors to NTS.167 Afterwards, one
of Livermore Lab’s testing experts testified that CORRTEX should be used for calibration purposes alone:
It used to be that we knew the Soviet Union would reject almost all of our verification proposals . . .
Today she appears willing to accept almost any verification proposal made by the United States and
then to throw in a few ideas of her own . . . With any verification scheme, there are costs and benefits
which must be balanced. For the TTBT, the costs can be measured in terms of the dollars and the
resources required, the interference and the diversion with our ongoing research and development
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programs and the possibilities of providing classified information to the other country on our nuclear
design program. The JVE demonstrated that the dollar and the resource costs associated with such
measurements will be substantial.168
If technical collaboration confirmed Soviet opposition to routine hydrodynamic verification, validated U.S.
arms control advocates’ skepticism, and raised new doubts among Reagan and Bush officials, why did the
superpowers finally agree to on-site yield measures for all shots over 50 kilotons?169
Soviet acquiescence is best explained as part of a political strategy to use the West’s technical approach to
verification to increase popular pressure for arms control. By 1988, the Soviets had embraced “verificational
deterrence.” Given the “deficit of mutual trust,” they argued that cooperative security involved deep arms cuts
combined with the “most stringent mutual verification.”170 Henceforth, when the West asked for “double
verification,” they would respond “with readiness for triple verification.”—that is NTM, obligatory OSIs, and
international verification arrangements.171 As he arms control measure that could be most easily verified and
most effective in ending the arms race, a CTB was integral to their strategy.172 In the past, they said, real or
alleged verification problems had blocked a CTB. The JVE, however, showed that these issues could be settled
through “businesslike deliberations” rather than ideological confrontations.173 Now, “everything revolves around
the political will and responsible attitude of Washington. The ball is in the American court.”174
The Soviets switched from talk about “triple verification” to agreement on a TTBT verification triad once
they concluded that the new protocol would involve few costs and risks. Budgetary pressures made it unlikely
that the United States would routinely spend ten million dollars on CORRTEX when compliance could be
confirmed by less expensive means. Besides, popular protests in the USSR reduced the number of Soviet tests
to be monitored. In March 1990, they decided to close the Semipalatinsk site and test only at Novaya Zemlya,
where inhospitable conditions and difficult logistics constrain operations. Nordic outrage soon complicated this
plan.175 The only Soviet test under the new protocol occurred on October 24, 1990, too soon after ratification
to prepare for CORRTEX.176 Moscow sent monitors to tests at NTS in September 1991 and March 1992. One
cannot, however, evaluate how the TTBT protocol worked in practice because the signatories never released such
information.177
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The United States refused to decrease its CORRTEX demands for two reasons. First, by the time that some
U.S. officials publicly acknowledged the costs and risks of intrusive verification, the idea that routine use of
CORRTEX was essential for effective verification had become another “political fact of life,” much like
requirements for twenty annual OSIs were for Eisenhower. Unilateralists averted compromise and obstructed
future cooperation by insisting that tests limits below 150 kilotons would only be acceptable if DOE could
minimize espionage and disruption without lowering U.S. requirements for highly intrusive verification. Such
precautions might be possible at high yield limits, but are increasingly difficult at lower yields and impossible
for a total ban.
Second, some in the Executive branch wanted extensive verification for competitive, rather than
cooperative, reasons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended ratification only if the United States exercised its
full spectrum of monitoring and inspection rights and Congress supported five safeguards similar to those
adopted for the LTBT. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative told the Senate Armed Services Committee
that “effective verification procedures . . . allow us to make more accurate judgments regarding the significance
of Soviet tests.”178 In other words, the military wanted to use CORRTEX not only to monitor compliance with
the 150 yield threshold but also to collect collateral information about such things as the design of much
smaller permissible tests.
The safeguards also did more to advance U.S. nuclear testing than to promote test ban cooperation. The JCS
wanted an “insurance policy” in the form of Senate pledges to test up to treaty yield limits, maintain modern
nuclear laboratories, preserve abilities to test in prohibited environments and yield ranges, and fund strong
verification and intelligence programs. Resource constraints and conflicting priorities had forced DOE to cut the
annual number of tests from seventeen in the early 1980s to eight in 1990. The laboratory directors wished to
double the test rate, but only got a six percent budget increase for FY91. The safeguards conditioned arms
control at high yields on increased money for nuclear tests below the 150 kiloton limit.179 They also created
obligations that could postpone further negotiations because DOE declared that it must test at the current rate for
ten more years just to determine whether lower yield limits would serve U.S. interests.180
On September 25, 1990, the Senate ratified the TTBT and PNET with little debate and few illusions about
future constraints. Reagan had created a double bind by linking further test limits to a parallel program of
weapons cuts, yet saying that reductions might require more tests to ensure the safety, reliability and
survivability of the remaining arsenal.181 The Soviets considered it “senseless to sign agreements to eliminate
stocks of existing weapons with one hand and to fling open the door to new and more sophisticated types of
weapons with the other.”182 But even before the TTBT protocol was signed, Bush repudiated Reagan’s pledge to
follow ratification with immediate talks on intermediate limits. No further negotiations would occur during a
“period of observation . . . to assess the verification lessons learned” by implementing the TTBT
protocol—that is verification concerns were used again to justify delay.183 The irony was not lost on arms
control advocates. Largely despite the JVE rather than because of it, the Soviets had finally implemented an
intrusive program for monitoring test ban compliance. But instead of building on this breakthrough to achieve
more meaningful test restraints, the United States now wished to spend tens of millions of dollars and unknown
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years practicing cooperative verification of very high yield tests. In the words of Congressman Jim Leach (R,
Iowa), the JVE was “rather interesting enormous progress on step back aspects of verification.”184
The most obvious conclusion seems to be that technical collaboration cannot promote arms control when
one or more parties are using verification concerns to stave off popular pressure for arms control agreements that
they do not really want. Yet, the JVE did promote cooperation in ways that Reagan and Bush never intended.
The data leaks proved that technological arguments are not infinitely elastic; after the JVE, the only people who
could argue that CORRTEX was significantly more accurate than sophisticated seismology were those for
whom “validity of the testimony as to technical fact is totally irrelevant. The only validity intended is an
expression of Executive Office policy relative to the matter under discussion.”185 Furthermore, the process of
designing and implementing the JVE induced those who conduct U.S. nuclear tests to move away from an
abstract insistence on extreme verification demands toward a more practical understanding of verification
tradeoffs. Along with the independent scientists involved in the NRDC–SAS project and the OTA seismic
study, these DOE scientists could offer valuable expertise if serious efforts are made to construct a CTB
verification regime that detects, deters, and reassures, without imposing excessive costs.
Finally, the JVE contributed to the U.S. decision to resume serious CTB talks in January 1994. After Bush
answered Gorbachev’s second moratorium by limiting the United States to six tests a year, Congress lost
patience. In the summer of 1992, both Houses supported a complete and binding ban for nine months, a brief
period of highly regulated safety and reliability tests, and a total ban by 1996. The unilateralists’ attempt to use
collaborative verification to block arms control cooperation had contributed to their undoing. Perceptions that
Reagan used technology collaboration to subvert the test ban movement rekindled domestic grassroots activism
and united those who would accept nothing less than a CTB with those willing to start with lower yield
limits.186 Anger with U.S. inaction also prompted an international amendment conference to convert the LTBT
into a total ban.187 Of equal importance, intergovernmental collaboration gave mainstream Americans more
confidence in test ban verification. Regardless of the Reagan administration’s motives, their involvement gave
the JVE increased legitimacy for cautious cooperators and increased applicability to formal treaties.
Conclusions and Implications
Analyzing test ban technology collaboration in terms of an ongoing argument among six groups with divergent
views on arms control and verification shows that verification collaboration is more, rather than less, political
by virtue of being second-order cooperation. Contrary to the benign view of verification that has dominated U.S.
policy and cooperation theory, enhanced compliance information offers no easy technical solution to the
problems of international cooperation. With neither a global authority to judge compliance, nor widespread
agreement about underlying principles, verification politics involve three basic quandaries.
How Much is Enough?
National leaders must decide how much compliance information would make the expected benefits of
cooperation outweigh the potential costs and risks. Not once during decades of debate about test ban verification
did domestic groups agree about the value of arms control, the other side’s intentions, or the stability of nuclear
deterrence. Sometimes the advantages of cooperation so clearly dwarf potential costs and risks that arms control
advocates and cautious cooperators would support a range of verification arrangements. The LTBT and the
renegotiated TTBT show that when criticisms based on unverifiability would be implausible even to very
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cautious cooperators, unilateralists will accept modest cooperative measures in return for “safeguards” that ensure
support for other forms of competition.
When genuine disagreements about verifiability exist, other tactics are used. As expected, actors frequently
tried to take verification decisions out of the political arena by declaring them technical questions on which the
judgment of designated experts should prevail. In the first round of CTB talks, Americans used this strategy in
both negotiations and domestic debates. During the 1980s, proponents of seismic and hydrodynamic methods
disputed the technical credentials and political motivations of scientists on the other side. At the end of the Cold
War, the Soviets even adopted the language of the West and suggested that all the verification concerns about a
CTB could be solved by letting scientists study the question in a “businesslike fashion.” Yet, negotiators could
devise detailed procedures that seemed both workable and tolerable only for the TTBT and PNET—treaties that
limited explosions with little military value—and even those pragmatic solutions quickly came under attack
from U.S. unilateralists who feared pressures and precedents for a CTB. Whenever stakes were high, nobody who
understood test ban verification politics fell for promises that disagreements could be “depoliticized” by bringing
in somebody else’s experts to decide. Thus, verification remains the subject of intense political struggle.
Proposals and projects for verification collaboration were often used to assemble a winning coalition of
groups who support a particular arms control outcome for diverse reasons. While cautious cooperators value
verification collaboration for its own sake, arms control advocates and unilateralists are more likely to initiate
technical collaboration as part of identification, alliance, and realignment strategies that often have unexpected
results.
Test ban debates and negotiations were characterized by continual uncertainty about motives and frequent
attempts to use collaborative verification to identify which actors really valued arms control. During the
disarmament deadlocks of the 1950s and early 1980s, U.S. arms control advocates proposed joint research
projects in the expectation that cautious cooperators would support them and unilateralists would resist. The
Reagan administration made support for cooperative verification the “litmus test” of Soviet commitment to
arms control. Gorbachev embraced the NRDC–SAS project in order to represent himself as someone who desired
a CTB as much as U.S. arms control advocates and cautious cooperators did.
In the test ban case, using verification collaboration as an identification strategy failed to increase
cooperation. The more actors doubt others’ intentions, the more they will suspect strategic misrepresentation. If
verification collaboration seems to carry low costs and risks relative to the arms control issue at stake, devious
players might collaborate a little to gain a lot by defecting from the larger cooperative enterprise. For many
Americans, the NRDC–SAS project simply shifted skepticism from Gorbachev’s motives for making unilateral
arms control initiatives to his reasons for collaborating with opponents of U.S. testing policy. There is no
evidence, however, to suggest that the Soviets ever agreed to test ban technology collaboration in order to lull
the West into signing a treaty with verification weaknesses that the USSR could systematically exploit.
By contrast, U.S. unilateralists often used strategic misrepresentation and misidentification to blame the
Soviets for failure to reach agreements that testing proponents did not really want. Because U.S. arms control
advocates and cautious cooperators clung to a benign view of verification, they could be manipulated into
treating Soviet response to verification collaboration as a valid indicator of interest in arms control. Failure to
take seriously the costs and risks of verification created a Catch-22: if the USSR agreed to technical
collaboration, unilateralists could belittle it as a cheap way to mislead the West; if they resisted, arms control
opponents could claim that the Soviets would not make low-cost concessions for cooperation.
Once participants have identified (rightly or wrongly) the structure of other actors’ beliefs, they can use
alliance or realignment strategies to influence domestic policy. For example, U.S. test ban opponents tried to
convince cautious cooperators that CORRTEX was both essential for exacting verification and unacceptable to
the USSR in order to retain public support for Reagan’s nuclear testing policy. The NRDC, by contrast, sought
to persuade cautious cooperators that the Soviets were seriously interested in a CTB and would accept in-country
seismic methods that were as accurate as CORRTEX in order to forge an alliance against Reagan’s unilateralist
policy on test ban cooperation. Evidence of similar dynamics can be seen in the USSR, where Gorbachev hoped
that the NRDC–SAS project could build an arms control coalition by reassuring his own cautious cooperators
that verification glasnost need not involve intolerable costs and risks.
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Realignment strategies can involve education or intimidation. The Reagan administration tried to convert
cautious cooperators into confirmed unilateralists. Yet, their campaign to reeducate Americans about the dangers
of test limits met with modest and short-lived success: popular support for a CTB fell from 75 percent in 1977
to 54 percent in 1983, but resurgent fear of nuclear war caused a rebound to 69 percent by 1984.188 Th
NRDC’s plan to use dramatic displays of verification cooperation to substantiate Gorbachev’s intentions also
failed to turn cautious cooperators into arms control advocates committed to a CTB. Successful realignment
strategies involved more intimidation than education. Carter and Reagan entered office with deep convictions
about test limitations. While nothing suggests that personal preferences changed, orchestrated opposition
convinced both men to act more like cautious cooperators by raising the domestic cost of their preferred arms
control outcome.
In short, domestic agreement on verification requirements has rarely been reached through either of the two
strategies most commonly discussed by previous works on the politics of verification—establishing national
consensus on first principles or circumventing controversy by entrusting verification policy to technical experts.
This suggests that efforts to “depoliticize” verification are both futile and undesirable. Historically, arms control
advocates, cautious cooperators, and unilateralists have only been able to agree that a particular set of
verification provisions are “good enough” when the relatively high benefits and low risks of a treaty made
verification largely irrelevant to arms control outcomes. Verification can only tip the scales between cooperation
and competition if we understand how identification, alliance, realignment, and avoidance strategies produce
provisional verification policies when first principles are hotly contested. Verification offers no easy technical
solution to arms control dilemmas because asking “how much is enough?” only multiplies the uncertainty and
controversy surrounding nuclear cooperation.
The test ban case also suggests that viewing verification debates solely as decisions about “how much is
enough?” obscures two other ways in which nuclear arms control verification is inherently political. Without
exploring what I will call the “workable/tolerable dilemma” and the “thermonuclear dilemma,” one cannot
understand why actors argue about verification rather than debating first principles directly and how to redirect
the politics of verification so that technical collaboration increases security cooperation.
The Workable/Tolerable Dilemma
National leaders must decide not only how much compliance information they need to detect, deter, and reassure,
but also what type of verification to support. A benign, technical view of verification ignores both the costs and
risks of different monitoring systems and the full range of effects that verification has on cooperative incentives,
capabilities, and perceptions. Even if groups in domestic debates and international negotiations reached
consensus on the structure of an arms control problem—that is the relative value of mutual cooperation,
asymmetrical compliance, and continued competition—they could not determine optimal monitoring levels
without agreement on a second equation. The “workable/tolerable dilemma” involves decisions about the
appropriate way to relate the value gained by incremental improvements in verification capabilities to the value
lost by making monitoring systems more expensive, intrusive, and inconvenient. Technical experts cannot use a
“problem solving” approach to depoliticize negotiations because alternative ways of balancing workability and
tolerability produce countless logical arguments for different verification arrangements.
The test ban case supports the hypothesis that national views on verification reflect a state’s security
situation rather than its arms control intentions. Power imbalances influenced preferences about the amount and
timing of test ban verification. The United States was reluctant to relinquish its nuclear monopoly without
extensive verification, while the Soviets worried that an international control commission would hamper their
nuclear development plans, but never convince the United States to disarm. Likewise, so long as the Soviets
saw secrecy as a security asset, they tried to minimize inspection at sensitive sites and to accept intrusive
verification only in return for accords that brought major arms control benefits. With nuclear parity, Soviet
resistance to NTM decreased, but their opposition to OSIs remained intense long after the asymmetry in
strategic weapons was gone.
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Political differences also influenced national views on verification. Throughout the Cold War, Western
leaders placed greater value on verification information because they had more need to inform the public about
Soviet testing programs and treaty compliance without jeopardizing secret intelligence sources. Likewise, Soviet
concerns about verification decision making reflected fears that the United States could dominate the
international control organization envisioned during early CTB talks, and that the United States and United
Kingdom could out-vote the Soviets if the majority ruled in a trilateral regime. The Soviet leaders’ desire to
minimize domestic opposition by restricting security information and foreign ideas also increased vulnerability
to the subversive effects of technical collaboration and cooperative verification.
Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev saw excess secrecy as a security liability that fueled worst case analyses
and arms races. He sought reliable compliance information from revealable sources to increase popular support
for cooperative security. Finally, he hoped that broader access to security information and increased contact with
Western arms control advocates would strengthen his allies, weaken hard-liners, and institutionalize internal
change.
Despite this more positive assessment, Gorbachev never stopped acting in terms of verification trade-offs.
The NRDC project appealed to him because it minimized the risks of cooperation relative to the possible gains.
If Gorbachev had adopted a benign view of verification, then the JVE would have been equally attractive because
it also reduced secrecy; improved detection, deterrence and reassurance capabilities; and involved an exchange of
data and experts with the West. Gorbachev’s resistance reflected other calculations: conducting the JVE was far
more expensive than the NRDC project and involved an extended American presence inside the Semipalatinsk
test site, yet working with the Reagan administration was unlikely to secure a CTB or even TTBT ratification
without routine intrusions. The Soviets retained their requirements that verification be accurate, nonintrusive,
and practical. Agreement on the TTBT verification triad came only as a result of changed security circumstances
that lowered the risks of intrusion (budgetary constraints on Western inspectors and an end to Soviet tests) and
political compromises in which signatories could use whichever combination of methods they deemed most
accurate as long as they paid most of their own expenses.
Acknowledging the differences between national views should not obscure variations in domestic groups’
sensitivity to the costs and risks of verification. Even after Gorbachev and other Soviet arms control advocates
decided that technical collaboration could make valuable contributions to arms control politics, they faced
resistance from their own cautious cooperators who still worried about verification abuse and from unilateralists
who opposed unreciprocated access to sensitive locations. Likewise, U.S. unilateralists saw competitive uses of
verification and knew what requests would trigger Soviet resistance. Then they could use the myth of benign
verification to convince cautious cooperators in the United States that Soviet refusal reflected devious motives.
In the competition for the middle ground, unilateralists almost always out-maneuvered arms control advocates
because the former understands the dark side of verification demands while the latter clings to the hope that
increased information will necessarily enhance cooperation.
When incentives for and against cooperation are roughly even, successful negotiators must know how
principal players view verification and believe that acceptable arrangements can be found. The Conference of
Experts’ consensus helped to initiate arms control talks by promising that conflicting verification preferences
could be reconciled. But the technical talks that preceded diplomatic negotiations produced a document that
concealed major substantive differences and deep procedural disputes. It generated false hopes, frustration, and
angry accusations about bargaining in bad faith.189
Technology collaboration is most productive when diplomatic negotiators use technical talks to explore and
expand the range of feasible options rather than to pressure the other side into accepting particular arrangements.
As an official part of the negotiating process or a second-track exchange of ideas in a more informal setting,
technical meetings are relatively removed from the glare of publicity and thus allow more freedom for inquiry.
One cannot assume that scientists will “talk the truth,” or even “speak the same language” because they share a
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technical background. One can, however, compare and contrast their approaches to verification problems to
determine the various technical and political principles that shape their thinking. Negotiators can then use this
information to find existing verification procedures that suit national preferences, to suggest research projects
that might find new means to reconcile conflicting concerns, or explore ways to make arms control objectives
and verification attitudes more conducive to cooperation.
Technical talks and joint research projects can clarify or modify participants’ verification preferences, but
this will only change arms control outcomes if these insights are communicated to policy makers and influential
public groups. Participants at scientific conferences and test ban negotiations learned about each other’s
concerns, recognized important trade-offs, and explored concessions that could secure a mutually-acceptable
agreement. Without effective steps to popularize these ideas, compromises that could have secured an early CTB
were shunned because Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy could not answer unilateralists’ demands for more
verification without losing credibility as guardians of national security. Likewise, Carter settled for a mini-
moratorium rather than argue publicly that the Soviets had legitimate reasons to resist expensive and intrusive
verification for minimal constraints. TTBT ratification was delayed for sixteen years partly because U.S.
unilateralists convinced cautious cooperators that the verification compromises reflected a rash disregard for
national security rather than a rational attempt to balance increased information against greater intrusion,
interference, and expense. After the JVE, talk about the costs and risks of verification was used to obstruct future
cooperation by legitimizing the view that arms control could only serve U.S. interests when the government
could maximize compliance information, neutralize the risks, and subsidize the high costs of intrusive
verification.
The Thermonuclear Dilemma
Any type of international cooperation involves decisions about the evaluating compliance. Yet, nuclear
verification receives much more attention than does monitoring for economic coordination, environmental
protection, or humanitarian relief. The intensity and intractability of arguments over test ban technology
collaboration suggest a third dimension where the main question is existential rather than distributional.
Arguments about test ban verification reflect the thermonuclear dilemma: how best to manage the tremendous
uncertainty and vulnerability created by nuclear weapons?
The cooperative control of thermonuclear weapons differs from other joint ventures because a small amount
of nuclear material can produce rapid and massive destruction against which other states have no effective
defense. Thus, nowhere are the benefits of mutual cooperation greater, or the temptations to defect and the fears
of exploitation stronger. No one has solved the logical and practical problems associated with deterrence, nor has
anyone found a persuasive answer to the contradictions inherent in collective security.190 One cannot escape
from this dilemma by prioritizing short or long-term benefits, nor by emphasizing absolute or relative gains,
because each decision principle can support either cooperative or competitive solutions. Extreme interdependence
and intense pressures both for and against cooperation increase the value of verification confidence, while the
spread of nuclear capabilities and the disastrous consequences of low-level cheating or espionage make fully-
reliable verification impossible to obtain.
The thermonuclear dilemma polarizes some actors and paralyses others. Arms control advocates and
unilateralists respond by discounting arguments against their preferred solution, while cautious cooperators react
by worrying about what could go wrong if security policy moves too far in either direction. This explains why
arms control advocates and unilateralists are actively employ technical collaboration in strategies designed to
secure particular arms control outcomes, while cautious cooperators—the group whose belief structure provides
the greatest incentives to initiate technology collaboration—actually play the most passive role in verification
politics.
Positions taken in test ban politics often reflect strategies to avoid dealing directly with the thermonuclear
dilemma. Arms control advocates do not always take verification seriously because they are so convinced that
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cooperative control of weapons development is essential.191 Unilateralists use verification concerns to avoid
thinking carefully about the dangers of endless nuclear tests and weapons development. Cautious cooperators
handle their anxieties by believing that benign verification, technical collaboration, and unilateral safeguards can
someday secure risk-free cooperation. Democratic leaders use incompatible verification demands to finesse
contradictory pressures to negotiate arms control agreements and increase unilateral security capabilities.
Technical collaboration offers “something for everybody,” which explains the popularity of Reagan’s “Trust
but Verify” approach to arms control. The rituals of test ban verification politics—including technical talks,
joint research projects, and monitoring demonstrations—distract attention from deeper issues. The answer is not
to depoliticize verification or avoid controversy by agreeing on lowest-common-denominator forms of technical
collaboration. Instead, the key to stable arms control is to acknowledge the many ways in which verification is
an intensely political act and to use that knowledge to clarify and confront the central dilemmas of nuclear
cooperation.
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